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“ZOOMING IN”: GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE 
ROLE OF COURTS IN SHAPING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
DOCTRINE 
MADELINE G. ZIEGLER* 
 
The killing of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officers 
shocked the Nation into intense, renewed awareness regarding police use of 
force.1  In the wake of increased activism surrounding police conduct, 
national attention has turned once again to the qualified immunity doctrine.2  
The doctrine of qualified immunity creates a default presumption of 
immunity for executive officials performing discretionary functions, and 
further protects those actors from financial liability,3 operating as a barrier to 
plaintiffs attempting to challenge police conduct.4 
Qualified immunity exists as one option amidst a range of other 
judicially created immunities for public officials such as absolute immunity 
for judicial officials.  The qualified immunity doctrine purportedly exists to 
shield the government from the burdens of unwarranted, excessive lawsuits 
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 1. George Floyd: What Happened in the Final Moments of His Life; BBC NEWS  (July 16, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726; Hannah Klein, Protests Over 
George Floyd’s Death Spread Around the World, SLATE (June 5, 2020, 5:03 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/george-floyd-worldwide-protests.html.  
 2. Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point Amid 
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualified-
immunity.html.  
 3. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967) (establishing qualified immunity for executive 
officials and stating the purpose of the doctrine).  
 4. See Marcus R. Nemeth, Note, How Was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development of 
Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C. L. REV. 989, 994 
(2019) (“The intersection of qualified immunity and excessive force doctrine has rendered § 1983 
plaintiffs highly vulnerable and unlikely to succeed on the merits.”). 
  
2021] “ZOOMING IN” 831 
 
against its executive officials.5  However, growing scholarly consensus 
demonstrates that the qualified immunity doctrine insulates police officers 
from egregious forms of misconduct,6 promotes “constitutional stagnation,”7 
and fails to achieve the proposed reasons for its continued existence, such as 
saving the government time and money.8  Yet, even as a surprisingly diverse 
consensus of voices denounce qualified immunity, the Supreme Court 
continues to enforce the doctrine with gusto,  and all signals point to the fact 
that the Court’s position is unlikely to change.9  This reality is juxtaposed 
with greater public pressure to end the doctrine as applied to police officers 
in excessive force cases, and growing dissent within the judiciary itself.10    
With this context in mind, this Comment has two purposes: the first is 
theoretical, and the second is practical.  
First, I seek to reframe the current discussion of qualified immunity by 
conceptualizing the doctrine as a mode of government surveillance that 
disproportionately impacts individuals of color.11  The qualified immunity 
analysis, based both on its historical roots and present application, can be 
considered a mode of government surveillance, which subjects plaintiffs’ 
behavior to an unwarranted level of scrutiny, while analytically overlooking 
 
 5. See infra Section I.  
 6. See Nemeth, supra note 4, at 994 (arguing that the Supreme Court “has rendered victims of 
excessive police force helpless” against police misconduct through current qualified immunity 
doctrine).  
 7. Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation 
of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 402 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 
abandonment of a constitutional-merits first analysis in qualified immunity doctrine stagnates the 
development of constitutional law).   
 8. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2017) 
(demonstrating empirically that most cases involving qualified immunity do not save the 
government from financial burdens).  
 9. As recently as June 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to cases which challenged 
qualified immunity.  See Nick Sibilla, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Challenges to Qualified 
Immunity, Only Thomas Dissents, FORBES (June 15, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
nicksibilla/2020/06/15/supreme-court-refuses-to-hear-challenges-to-qualified-immunity-only-
clarence-thomas-dissents/?sh=401355477fad; see also Jay Schweikert, The Supreme Court’s 
Dereliction of Duty on Qualified Immunity, CATO INST. (June 15, 2020, 11:27 AM), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/supreme-courts-dereliction-duty-qualified-immunity (positing that the 
Court may not hear cases on qualified immunity hoping to “duck” the issue and pressure Congress 
into action during a highly politically charged moment).  
 10. See Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante) 
(“I write separately to register my disquiet over the kudzu-like creep of the modern immunity 
regime.”); see also James A. Wynn Jr., As a Judge, I Have to Follow the Supreme Court. It Should 
Fix This Mistake, WASH. POST (June 12, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2020/06/12/judge-i-have-follow-supreme-court-it-should-fix-this-mistake/ (arguing that 
as a federal appellate judge, he believes the Supreme Court must reform the doctrine of qualified 
immunity).   
 11. See infra Section II.A. 
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defendant public officials’ conduct.12  In excessive force claims brought 
under the Fourth Amendment, which this Comment will focus on, the 
qualified immunity doctrine serves as a near-impenetrable veil that 
obfuscates the behavior of defendants.  Though Section 1983 theoretically 
provides an individual cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional 
liberties,13 under which the actions of government officials should be 
scrutinized, the qualified immunity analysis inverts the court’s gaze to hyper-
focus on the conduct of the very individuals whose rights were allegedly 
violated.14  Thus, a mode of state oppression lurks even in the legal claim 
which supposedly creates a cause of action for the vindication of rights 
against law enforcement officers.  In other words, even when the “bad 
behavior” of a law enforcement officer is supposedly on trial, the court’s eyes 
fall heavily on, and even punish, the conduct of the (often) black and brown 
claimants.  
The second goal of this Comment is practical.  The framing of 
government surveillance elucidates suggestions for various institutional 
actors including courts, legislators, and the general public.15  
This Comment is divided into two parts, Background and Analysis.  The 
Background will recount the historical roots of both the Section 1983 cause 
of action and the qualified immunity doctrine, and their connection with 
racial conflict in the United States.16  Then, I will unpack challenges plaintiffs 
face confronting the qualified immunity doctrine as a defense to liability, 
especially in cases of excessive force, focusing in detail on the interpretive 
steps courts take in defining constitutional violations, reconstructing facts, 
and determining clearly established law based on current Supreme Court 
precedent.17  Part I will conclude by recounting the current status of qualified 
immunity doctrine on the Supreme Court and in the federal judiciary.18   
Moving to the second Part, the Analysis will define government 
surveillance and trace its connection with race in the United States through 
policing and the legal system.19  Section A will explain how courts may 
generally play a role in furthering state oppression and posits that courts may 
reverse this trend in Section 1983 claims.  Section B will unpack the 
ramifications of the government surveillance framing, arguing that the mode 
 
 12. See infra Section II.B. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 14. See infra Section II.B..  
 15. See infra Section II.C.. 
 16. See infra Section I.A. 
 17. See infra Section I.B.  
 18. See infra Section I.B..  
 19. See infra Section II.A.  
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of analysis courts employ in excessive force cases brought under 
Section 1983 hyper-scrutinizes the conduct of plaintiffs and simultaneously 
“overlooks” the conduct of defendants.20  Thus, courts further the 
oppression21 which black and brown individuals are subject to in other 
spheres through over-surveillance.  The qualified immunity analysis 
obfuscates the behavior of defendants in four key ways: (1) by preventing 
courts from scrutinizing a defendant’s actual knowledge, (2) by prohibiting 
an inquiry into subjective intent, (3) by priming courts to overlook the 
conduct of defendants, and (4) by minimizing the role of the objective fact 
finder.22  Finally, Section C of the Analysis will offer brief suggestions for 
various institutional actors based on the framing of government 
surveillance.23   
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Foundations of Modern Qualified Immunity Doctrine 
Citizens may sue state government officials who violate their federal 
constitutional rights for money damages under Section 1983.24  The first 
iteration of Section 1983 originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1871.25  After 
the Civil War, federal legislators sought to secure the rights of formerly 
enslaved persons against various deprivations of liberties threatened by 
southern states by passing Reconstruction legislation and the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.26   
Though the Fourteenth Amendment27 guaranteed that no state could 
deny life, liberty, or property to a citizen without due process of law, two 
problems remained after its passage.  First, widespread violence against and 
disenfranchisement of formerly enslaved persons continued to pervade many 
 
 20. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 21. Although I posit that courts play a role in state oppression, this Comment does not imply 
that judges consciously seek to oppress the individuals in their courts.  My point is that the mode of 
analysis courts employ may unwittingly further state oppression.  
 22. See discussion infra Section II.B.ii.  
 23. See infra Section II.C. A range of perspectives exist as to whether the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, and immunities for state actors in general, should be reformed or abolished entirely.  This 
Comment does not take a position on any side of the debate, but rather makes suggestions to address 
qualified immunity doctrine as it currently exists and pertains to this analysis.  
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 25. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433, 433–40 (1871).  
 26. For the political and congressional history of these Acts, see generally Xi Wang, The 
Making of Federal Enforcement Laws, 1870-1872: 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1013 (1995); Robert J. 
Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal 
Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187 (2005).  
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
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states, and states either lacked requisite legislation guaranteeing a remedy, or 
lacked the power or will to enforce such remedies when rights were 
deprived.28  Second, it was unclear whether the President had the power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment independently.29  Thus, when passing the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as Section 1983, Congress sought to 
create a mechanism through which the Fourteenth Amendment could be 
enforced.30  
For almost a century, Section 1983 lay dormant as a cause of action.31  
But in 1961, the Supreme Court held, in Monroe v. Pape,32 that action “under 
color of law”33 includes a variety of state action, and does not simply pertain 
to state officials enforcing state laws.34  In other words, “Monroe definitively 
determined that Section 1983’s scope was as broad as the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”35  Following Monroe, federal courts experienced a 
flood of Section 1983 lawsuits for the first time.  Importantly, the judicial 
quickening of the Section 1983 cause of action came about amidst newly 
emerging national concerns about racial deprivations of liberty.36  In Monroe, 
police officers executed a warrantless entry into a black family’s home, made 
the parents and children strip naked while the officers searched their 
apartment, and then arrested one of the family members on baseless 
charges.37  Understood in its “political and social setting[],” the Monroe 
decision was reached by a newly race-conscious, post-Brown Supreme Court 
in the midst of the Civil Rights era.38  
The text of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not mention immunity for 
government officials.39  Yet, in Pierson v. Ray,40 the Supreme Court suddenly 
extended a version of the common law immunity of judicial officials to 
 
 28. Grant’s Address, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 244 (1871).  
 29. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172–74 (1961).   
 30. Id.  
 31. James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 393, 412 (2003).  
 32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).  
 33. Id. at 186–87.  
 34. Id. at 185. 
 35. Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 is Born: The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of Tenney 
and Monroe, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1019, 1059 (2013).  
 36. Id. at 1020–22.  
 37. 365 U.S. at 169.  
 38. Nahmod, supra note 35, at 1023.  
 39. See Caroline H. Reinwald, A One-Two Punch: How Qualified Immunity’s Double Dose of 
Reasonableness Dooms Excessive Force Claims in the Fourth Circuit, 98 N.C. L. REV. 665, 667 
(2020) (tracing the history of common law immunities).  
 40. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
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executive actors such as police officers in Section 1983 claims.41  The Court 
reached its conclusion by reading Section 1983 against the background of 
other common law immunities—for example, the total immunity available to 
judges and legislators—as well as the common law defenses available to 
police officers in tort actions—for example, the defenses of good faith and 
probable cause when making an arrest.42  
Like the Court’s extension of the Section 1983 cause of action in 
Monroe, the origin of modern qualified immunity for executive officials in 
Pierson also must be read against the historical backdrop of the Civil Rights 
era.  In Pierson, the Court was asked to consider whether police officer 
respondents who arrested peaceful black ministers attempting to enter a 
“White Only” waiting room in Mississippi as an act of civil disobedience 
could be held liable by those individuals.43  The Court sided with the white 
officers and held that they were free from liability if they had acted in good 
faith with probable cause under a statute believed to be valid when making 
the arrest.44  
Despite its jurisprudential leap in Pierson, the Court did not explain the 
extent of immunity executive officials were entitled to.  Over the next decade, 
the Court clarified that immunity for executive officials was conditional 
(“qualified”) rather than absolute, and defined as “the existence of reasonable 
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, 
coupled with good-faith belief . . . for acts performed in the course of official 
conduct.”45  Still, the Court continued to deny immunity to officials based on 
either an objective showing when those officials reasonably should have 
known that their action would violate a constitutional right, or a subjective 
showing that the officials acted with “malicious intention” to deprive 
someone of a Constitutional right.46  
 
 41. Id. at 555–57.  
 42. Id. at 556–57.  See also 5 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, HARPER, 
JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 29.10 (3d ed. 2020) (Discussing the “broad[] privilege” developed in 
actions against judicial officials at common law, the history of common law immunities awarded to 
public officials, and various policy justifications for judicial immunity such as safeguards built into 
the judicial process to prevent unconstitutional conduct; “That privilege has been extended by the 
weight of American case law to other officials whose functions are neither judicial nor . . . related 
to judicial . . . activities. These have included both legislative officials and a host of other officers 
whose responsibilities are essentially administrative”; The main justification for the extension of 
this immunity is based on “questions of the proper relationship between coordinate branches of 
government.”).  
 43. 386 U.S. 547 at 553. 
 44. Id. at 555. 
 45. Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974). 
 46. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).  
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Then, in 1982, the Supreme Court rewrote the qualified immunity 
playbook in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.47  First, the Harlow court clarified that 
courts should no longer consider an official’s subjective intent in 
Section 1983 claims because the fact-intensive question of subjective intent 
would needlessly subject the government to the burdens of discovery, as well 
as the time and costs of trial.48  In eliminating the subjective branch of the 
analysis, the Court specifically declared its desire to limit the amount of cases 
against government officials that are decided on the merits.49  Second, the 
Court clarified the new standard: Executive officials performing 
discretionary functions are immune from suit when “their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”50  
After Harlow, the doctrine of qualified immunity has become a 
formidable defense to individuals whose constitutional rights have allegedly 
been violated by executive officials like police officers.  The following 
sections explain why the qualified immunity analysis so often excuses 
defendant-executive officials from liability in a Section 1983 claim.  
B. Challenges Presented by the Qualified Immunity Analysis51  
Based on the Supreme Court’s standard in Harlow, courts now apply a 
two-part test to determine whether qualified immunity applies: (1) whether a 
constitutional violation occurred, and (2) whether the right was clearly 
established at the time of the violation.52  
i. The First Prong of the Qualified Immunity Analysis: Constitutional 
Violation   
The first prong of the qualified immunity analysis has followed a strange 
developmental path under Supreme Court precedent: Today, courts have 
license to functionally ignore the question of whether a constitutional 
violation occurred in favor of relying on the test’s second prong (i.e., whether 
the right was clearly established at the time of the violation).  Yet, ignoring 
this first question has produced constitutional stagnation, and contributed to 
 
 47. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 48. Id. at 815–16.  
 49. Id. at 815–16, 818.  
 50. Id. at 818. 
 51. Importantly, this brief treatment of the complex issues presented by the qualified immunity 
doctrine is not exhaustive.  Many issues are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more thorough 
treatment of the issue, see generally John C. Jeffries Jr., What’s Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 
62 FLA. L. REV. 851 (2010). 
 52. See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam) (outlining 
the two-step analysis).  
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slow and conflicting precedents when courts face novel issues.53  I will only 
briefly address the first prong of the test, because most of this analysis centers 
on the second prong—determining clearly established law.  
Following Harlow, courts exercised their own discretion to determine 
when the constitutional violation question must be addressed in a 
Section 1983 analysis.54  Despite promptings from the Supreme Court 
suggesting a constitutional merits-first analysis,55 courts failed to address the 
question first, if at all.56  Then, after two decades of uncertainty, in Saucier v. 
Katz57 the Supreme Court mandated that the constitutional question must be 
considered first, before reaching the issue of clearly established law.58 
By addressing the constitutional question first, a court is more likely to 
determine the existence or non-existence of a constitutional right, thus 
engaging in constitutional development.59  Under constitutional merits-first 
sequencing, a court may find that a constitutional right existed in a given 
case, even if the officer did not violate that right under the circumstances or 
under the second prong of the analysis.60  This finding leaves the door open 
for plaintiffs to establish a violation existed under similar facts in the future.61  
Without mandatory sequencing, the danger is that the constitutional questions 
 
 53. Hughes, supra note 7, at 417.  
 54. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 672–673 (2009) (recounting the history of discretionary sequencing under the 
doctrine).  
 55. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991) (“A necessary concomitant to the 
determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the 
time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a 
constitutional right at all.  Decision of this purely legal question permits courts expeditiously to 
weed out suits which fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified 
immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits.”).   
 56. See Leong, supra note 54, at 670 (finding, in one empirical study, that “courts avoided the 
constitutional question in over a quarter of the cases in which the government officer raised a 
qualified immunity defense”).  
 57. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 58. Id. at 200–01 (“In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, 
the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence. . . . A court 
required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: 
Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the 
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?  This must be the initial inquiry.”).  
 59. Hughes, supra note 5353, at 404.  
 60. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (The Court recognized this principle in Saucier by noting that 
addressing the constitutional violation question first allows courts to “set forth principles” important 
for constitutional analyses in similar cases in the future, creating a case-by-case development of 
constitutional law).  
 61. Sarah Lochert, Note, Qualified Immunity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global War 
on Terror, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 829, 838–39 (2011).  
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at stake will remain unaddressed, leaving future plaintiffs without clear 
insight, and stagnating the development of the law.62 
Yet, in Pearson v. Callahan, 63 the Supreme Court abruptly changed 
course and overruled Saucier, allowing courts discretion to address or omit 
the constitutional violation question.64  The Court reasoned in Pearson that 
merits-first sequencing imposes an unnecessary burden on lower courts, 
despite the availability of alternative bases upon which the courts could easily 
dispose of a case.65  The Pearson decision has been widely criticized for 
creating confusion among the very courts that discretionary sequencing 
supposedly helped.66  Additionally, the abolishment of mandatory 
sequencing means that courts may be more likely to delay in resolving cases 
when the court faces a novel constitutional question, such as the use of 
evolving technologies by law enforcement officers.67  Even the Supreme 
Court avoids addressing the constitutional violation question.  In one of the 
Court’s most recent qualified immunity decisions, Kisela v. Hughes,68 the 
Court skipped the constitutional violation question entirely and proceeded 
directly to an analysis of whether the law was clearly established.69 
In summary, because plaintiffs must access a large body of case law 
specific to their claim to succeed in qualified immunity cases, judicial 
avoidance of the constitutional question may significantly limit plaintiffs’ 
ability to successfully bring a case on qualified immunity grounds.70  
 
 62. Hughes, supra note 53, at 401. 
 63. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).  
 64. Id. at 227 (“We now hold that the Saucier procedure should not be regarded as an inflexible 
requirement . . . .”).  
 65. See id. at 235 (recounting criticisms on this basis from various members of the Court).  
 66. See Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 318 (2020) 
(“The Court’s decision in Pearson has been widely criticized for creating confusion about the scope 
of constitutional rights.”).  
 67. See Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante) 
(“If courts leapfrog the underlying constitutional merits in cases raising novel issues like digital 
privacy, then constitutional clarity—matter-of-fact guidance about what the Constitution requires—
remains exasperatingly elusive.”); Schwartz, supra note 66, at 318 (“This concern is particularly 
acute for constitutional claims regarding novel practices and technologies, like Tasers and drones, 
for which there are few pre-Pearson decisions, and it can take many cases over many years for 
circuits to issue clarifying rulings.”). 
 68. 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam).   
 69. Id. at 1152 (“Here, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether Kisela violated the 
Fourth Amendment when he used deadly force against Hughes.”).  
 70. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 66, at 319 (“In a world without qualified immunity, it would 
be more difficult for district and appellate courts to avoid ruling on the merits of plaintiffs’ 
constitutional claims.”).  
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ii. The Second Prong of the Qualified Immunity Analysis: Clearly 
Established Law   
Even when a court finds that an official violated a plaintiff’s 
constitutional right, the claim may (and often does) fail when the court 
considers whether the right was clearly established at the time of the 
violation.71  Despite the importance of the “clearly established” branch of the 
qualified immunity analysis, the standard is mired in confusion.  First, it is 
unclear at what level of generality courts must analyze constitutional 
violations, creating a highly fact-specific approach, which virtually 
guarantees defeat for plaintiffs.  Second, it remains unclear whether a court 
may consider persuasive authority as well as binding authority in the clearly 
established law analysis, creating a circuit split that only the Supreme Court 
can resolve.  
a. Generality of Clearly Established Law 
Following its decision in Harlow, in Anderson v. Creighton,72 the 
Supreme Court clarified that in order to succeed on a Section 1983 claim, 
plaintiffs cannot simply allege a violation of “extremely abstract rights.”73  
Instead, the violated right must be “particularized” and “sufficiently clear that 
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right.”74  Yet, the Court has not clearly signaled what level of factual 
similarity between a case and prior precedent is necessary to constitute 
clearly established law. 
On one hand, since Anderson, the Court has consistently limited the 
clearly established law analysis to apply to narrowly defined, factually-bound 
rights.  In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 75 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
courts can find clearly established law “at a high level of generality,”76 
specifically noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred 
in finding clearly established law by looking to the general history and 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.77  On the other hand, the Supreme Court 
has denied that a particularized right entails exact factual similarity to 
precedent.78 
 
 71. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (iterating the “clearly established” standard 
for the first time).  
 72. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
 73. Id. at 639.  
 74. Id. at 640. 
 75. 563 U.S. 731 (2011).   
 76. Id. at 742. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 741. 
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Yet, the instruction that “existing precedent must have placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate”79 is interpreted by courts, 
in practice, to entail just such a fact-bound analysis.80  As a result, the 
inability to find factually similar cases cripples plaintiffs’ claims, especially 
when the violation is novel.81  Thus, the “clearly established” inquiry creates 
a system in which an official may violate a constitutional right, but as long 
as he is the first to violate the right, he will probably not be found liable. 
Directed to perform a fact-bound analysis without relying wholly on the 
facts, federal courts have developed vastly disparate approaches to the clearly 
established law analysis.  Some circuits demand legal precision and virtual 
factual identicality,82 adopting a formalist approach.83  Others, seeking to find 
breathing room for plaintiffs, define rights generally, and risk that their 
decisions will be summarily reversed by the Supreme Court.  The Ninth 
Circuit has been a specific victim of the Supreme Court’s summary reversals 
on the issue of clearly established law.84  Recently, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision denying qualified immunity to a police 
officer on this precise issue, accusing the Ninth Circuit of relying on an 
overly broad “right to be free of excessive force” instead of defining the right 
by asking  “whether clearly established law prohibited the officers from 
stopping and taking down a man in these circumstances.”85  
The Supreme Court has been surprisingly active in addressing the issue 
of clearly established law, to plaintiffs’ detriment.  From 2001 to 2016, the 
Court issued eighteen decisions addressing whether a right was clearly 
established in qualified immunity cases, finding in sixteen cases that the 
defendants did not violate clearly established law.86  Many of these decisions 
came as summary reversals.87  The Court’s actions have led scholars and 
 
 79. Id.  
 80. Jefferies, supra note 51, at 854–55.  
 81. See id. (Further specifying that “the fact-specific . . . approach does not mesh 
with . . . constitutional law or with the antecedent methodology of the common law,” because 
courts, including the Supreme Court, commonly draw general principles from precedent in applying 
the law to novel facts).  
 82. See Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 
NEV. L.J. 185, 197 (2008) (analyzing the overly fact-bound approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit 
for over a decade).  
 83. See Tyler Finn, Note, Qualified Immunity Formalism: ‘Clearly Established Law’ and the 
Right to Record Police Activity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 446–48 (2019) (identifying a circuit split 
among federal appellate courts on the First Amendment right to record police activity; some circuits 
take a formalist approach, relying only on nearly factually identical cases within the circuit).  
 84. See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 502 (2019) (per curiam).    
 85. Id. at 503.  
 86. Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. HEADNOTES 62, 63 (2016). 
 87. Id.  
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dissenters on the Court alike to conclude that the Court’s majority does 
demand near factual identicality in order to warrant the title of clearly 
established law.88  The Court’s frequent summary reversals, therefore, 
operate as a way to keep federal circuit courts in line and ensure that they 
continue to “stick to the facts.”89 
b. Sources of Authority for Clearly Established Law 
Another challenge faced by lower courts in determining clearly 
established law is whether courts must rely only on binding authority (from 
the Supreme Court and their own circuit), or whether persuasive authority 
may also constitute clearly established law.  Significantly, the Supreme Court 
declined to address this question in Harlow’s90 original holding, and over 
nearly four decades, the Court has continued to waver cryptically on the 
issue.  On one hand, the Court has intimated that a consensus of persuasive 
authority may demonstrate clearly established law,91 and, in Hope v. 
Peltzer,92 even looked to persuasive authority in its analysis of an Eighth 
Amendment violation.93  Yet, the Court subsequently restricted the standard 
for what may constitute a consensus of persuasive authority,94 and has even 
gone so far as to question whether a circuit’s own case law may be “a 
dispositive source of clearly established law.”95 
 
 88. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1161 (2018) (per curiam) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(“The majority’s decision, no matter how much it says otherwise, ultimately rests on a faulty 
premise: that those cases are not identical to this one.  But that is not the law, for our cases have 
never required a factually identical case to satisfy the ‘clearly established’ standard.”). 
 89. See Salazar-Limon v. Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) (noting “a disturbing trend regarding the use of this Court’s resources” 
regarding the frequency of the Court’s summary reversals in qualified-immunity cases); William 
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 48 (2018) (noting and critiquing 
the trend that the Supreme Court has been surprisingly willing to grant qualified immunity a place 
on its docket through summary reversals).   
 90. 457 U.S. 800 (1982) 
 91. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (“Petitioners have not brought to our 
attention any cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident that clearly 
established the rule on which they seek to rely, nor have they identified a consensus of cases of 
persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were 
lawful.”) (emphasis added).  
 92. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).  
 93. See id. at 744–45 (Referencing cases from other circuits, but ultimately concluding that the 
case law presented no relevant persuasive authority.  However, the Court later referenced a 
Department of Justice report to support its conclusion, which is technically a source of persuasive 
authority).  
 94. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011) (clarifying that any consensus 
of persuasive authority must be “robust” and so clear that the relevant precedent “must have placed 
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” creating a noticeably higher threshold for 
clearly established law).  
 95. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665–66 (2012).   
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Despite the Supreme Court’s reticence, the source of clearly established 
law can be critical in a qualified immunity analysis.  If a plaintiff is allowed 
to rely on persuasive authority to build their case, the universe of potentially 
factually similar precedent expands significantly.  Given the importance of 
factual similarity, the difference between relying on one circuit’s case law 
versus the broader universe of case law can be the differentiating factor 
between victory and certain defeat for plaintiffs.96  The Supreme Court has 
suggested that the critical question for courts is whether including case law 
from other circuits constitutes sufficient notice for government officials.97  
However, relying on an overly restrictive body of law may dangerously sever 
the qualified immunity analysis from the reasonableness standard which 
supposedly must govern the action of government officials, as well as other 
sources which influence government behavior, such as internal policy.98 
Federal circuits are split on this issue.  Some circuits, such as the 
Eleventh Circuit, rely only on binding precedent as established by the highest 
state courts in the jurisdiction as well as the Supreme Court.99  Other circuits, 
such as the First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, are willing to 
look beyond the decisions of their jurisdictions, and the Sixth Circuit is 
willing to do so “grudgingly.”100  The Ninth Circuit considers the widest body 
of case law, even going so far as to consider the unpublished opinions of 
other circuit courts.101 
The Supreme Court has done little to resolve the circuit split in its most 
recent qualified immunity decisions, but its dicta suggest a more conservative 
approach.  In City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 102 the Court 
essentially dodged the question, concluding that, “to the extent that a ‘robust 
consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ could itself clearly establish the 
federal right respondent alleges, no such consensus exists here.”103  And in 
City of Escondido v. Emmons,104 the Court muddied the waters in an area of 
 
 96. See Finn, supra note 83, at 460 “”(“Limiting the sources of law . . . makes for a restrictive 
and formalist assessment.”).   
 97. Id at 460 n.92.  
 98. In overly formalist jurisdictions, the question essentially becomes: “Is there a specific 
controlling case that would put an officer on notice that his behavior is unreasonable?”  The question 
should be: “Does a critical mass of law and policy exist that would put an officer on notice that his 
behavior is unreasonable?”  See generally Jeffries, supra note 51.  
 99. Id. at 858–59. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). 
 103. Id. at 1778 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).  
 104. 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019).  
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general consensus by implying that the circuit’s own appellate case law may 
not constitute binding precedent.105   
iii. Challenges Presented by the Qualified Immunity Doctrine in 
Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claims 
With the general challenges presented by the qualified immunity 
doctrine established, this discussion now turns to the unique challenges 
presented by the doctrine in the context of excessive force claims.  
Excessive force claims brought under the Fourth Amendment, which 
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by government 
officials, are governed by a unique application of the qualified immunity 
analysis.  The Supreme Court developed the test for what constitutes 
excessive force in Graham v. Connor.106  In Graham, the Court held, first, 
that based on the text of the Fourth Amendment, courts should not consider 
an officer’s subjective intent in favor of an “‘objective reasonableness’ 
standard,” and second, that this reasonableness standard should be largely 
governed by the individual facts of the case based on the “totality of 
circumstances.”107  Specifically, in weighing the actions of the officers, 
courts must consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect 
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether 
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”108  
The Graham analysis creates barriers for plaintiffs because the standard 
is based on a highly factually specific analysis muddled by conflicting 
Supreme Court precedent.  The Court has acknowledged that the Graham 
analysis yields vastly different results on what exactly constitutes reasonable 
force.109  Facing cases involving similar issues, the Court has come to 
divergent decisions; for example, in Tennessee v. Garner,110 the Court found 
an officer liable for using deadly force for shooting at a fleeing suspect, yet 
in Scott v. Harris,111 declined to find an officer liable for shooting at a fleeing 
suspect.112  It seems to follow that one or two facts can change the outcome 
 
 105. See id. at 503 (“Assuming without deciding that a court of appeals decision may constitute 
clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity . . . .”).  
 106. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  
 107. Id. at 392, 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985)). 
 108. Id. at 396.  
 109. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“Although respondent’s attempt to craft an 
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still 
slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”).  
 110. 471 U.S. at 3.  
 111. 550 U.S. at 376.  
 112. Nemeth, supra note 4, at 1015 n.126 (identifying this trend; further identifying that the 
Supreme Court’s precedents on the use of force appropriate to stop fleeing suspects are conflicting).  
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for cases which seem, on their faces, remarkably similar.  Thus, in Graham, 
the Court created a “reasonableness test that is inherently fact bound.”113 
Many concluded that it would be superfluous for a court to perform both 
the excessive force and qualified immunity analyses in the same case, given 
the near-identicality of the fact-bound reasonableness standards.114  
However, the Supreme Court has held otherwise.  Specifically, in Saucier v. 
Katz,115 the Supreme Court rejected eliminating the qualified immunity 
analysis in excessive force cases based on the near-identicality of the two 
standards.116  The Court reasoned that though the Graham analysis 
determines whether an officer made a reasonable mistake in applying force, 
the qualified immunity inquiry determines whether the officer made a 
reasonable mistake “as to the legal constraints on particular police 
conduct.”117  In other words, the qualified immunity analysis is primarily 
concerned with whether an officer had notice that a mistake would be 
unreasonable, as supplied by clearly established law.  Thus, an officer can 
make an unreasonable mistake under Graham, yet still warrant qualified 
immunity if he did not have notice that the mistake would be unlawful.  
In summary, the qualified immunity standard, as applied to excessive 
force cases, produces a strange double reasonableness regime.  Even within 
the Court, dissenting Justices have suggested that the qualified immunity 
standard applies to Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, essentially 
duplicating the same reasonableness analysis, usually in favor of the 
defendant-government officials.118  
iv. The Current State of the Law for Qualified Immunity  
Growing scholarly consensus demonstrates that the qualified immunity 
doctrine insulates police officers from even the most egregious forms of 
misconduct,119 promotes constitutional stagnation,120 and fails to achieve the 
proposed reasons for its continued existence, such as saving the government 
 
 113. Reinwald, supra note 39, at 670.  
 114. Nemeth, supra note 4, at 1015.  
 115. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).  
 116. Id. at 197.  
 117. Id. at 205.  
 118. See id. at 215–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As the foregoing discussion indicates, 
however . . . [t]he constitutional issue whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable in given 
circumstances routinely can be answered simply by following Graham’s directions. . . . Once it has 
been determined that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment . . . there is simply no work for a 
qualified immunity inquiry to do.”); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 648 (1987) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to the “double standard of reasonableness” created by the 
qualified immunity analysis in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases).  
 119. See supra note 6.  
 120. See supra note 7.  
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time and money.121  However, even as a surprisingly diverse consensus of 
voices have denounced qualified immunity,122 the Supreme Court has 
addressed qualified immunity only sparingly in the last decade, mostly 
through pro-defendant summary reversals.123  In June 2020, the Court denied 
certiorari to nine cases involving qualified immunity.124  
Therefore, though calls to end the doctrine of qualified immunity are not 
new, the Supreme Court continues to enforce the doctrine.125  This reality is 
juxtaposed with greater public pressure to end the doctrine, and growing 
dissent within the lower federal judiciary.126  Most notably, two members of 
the Court, Justices Sotomayor and Thomas, have explicitly vocalized 
willingness to re-examine and potentially overturn the doctrine for at least 
three years.127  Dissenting from the Supreme Court’s most recent refusal to 
grant certiorari to a batch of qualified immunity cases in 2020, in Baxter v. 
Bracey,128 Justice Thomas further criticized qualified immunity and indicated 
continued willingness to overturn the doctrine based on his position that the 
judge-made doctrine strays from the statute’s text.129 
v. Summary 
In the midst of the Civil Rights era, in Monroe v. Pape the Supreme 
Court breathed life into a piece of Reconstruction legislation, now codified 
as Section 1983, which served to give teeth to the Fourteenth Amendment.130  
Six years later, faced with an onslaught of Section 1983 litigation in federal 
 
 121. See supra note 8.  
 122. For example, the two Supreme Court Justices who have signaled a willingness to revisit the 
doctrine, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Thomas, often fall on divergent sides of the political 
spectrum.  Similarly, lower federal court criticism has stemmed from both liberal judges, and 
notably, even from more conservative, Trump-appointed judges.  See supra note 10.  
 123. See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2019) (per curiam); Kisela v. 
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) 
(per curiam); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam); City & Cnty. of S.F. v. 
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015).  
 124. Sibilla, supra note 9.  
 125. Schweikert, supra note 9.  
 126. See, e.g., Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring 
dubitante) (“I write separately to register my disquiet over the kudzu-like creep of the modern 
immunity regime.”).   
 127. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the doctrine for becoming “an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent 
effect of the Fourth Amendment”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“In an appropriate case, we should reconsider our 
qualified immunity jurisprudence.”). 
 128. 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020).  
 129. Id. at 1862 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
 130. See supra Section I.A. 
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courts, the Court suddenly extended a version of common law judicial and 
legislative immunity to law enforcement officers in Pierson v. Ray.131  Now, 
the qualified immunity doctrine serves as a formidable hurdle for plaintiffs. 
Courts must follow a two-step analysis for qualified immunity.  In the first 
branch of the analysis, courts inquire whether a constitutional violation 
occurred.132  Courts are permitted to skip this question entirely, stunting the 
availability of Constitutional precedent for future plaintiffs.133  Courts must 
also determine whether the individual’s right was clearly established at the 
time of the alleged violation.134  Many courts require that plaintiffs 
demonstrate a clearly established right through near factual identicality to 
prior case law, drawing only on mandatory sources of authority.135 
In addition to the general challenges presented by the qualified 
immunity doctrine, plaintiffs face additional challenges in excessive force 
claims brought under the Fourth Amendment.136  A defendant-executive 
official will not be liable even if he uses unreasonable force, so long as the 
court finds he did not have constitutional notice through prior case law.137  
Thus, the “double reasonableness” regime creates double barriers for 
plaintiffs.  Even faced with formidable scholarly, judicial, and public 
opposition, the doctrine of qualified immunity continues to shield law 
enforcement officers in Section 1983 actions.  
II. ANALYSIS 
In this Part, I argue that the courts’ application of the qualified immunity 
analysis, based both on its historical roots and present application, should be 
considered a method of government surveillance.  The framing of 
government surveillance reveals that the qualified immunity analysis, as 
applied in cases of excessive force, is dangerously void of analytical balance, 
lacking an objective gaze.  Specifically, the combination of the qualified 
immunity and excessive force analyses results in an unwarranted level of 
scrutiny aimed at plaintiffs, while analytically obfuscating and veiling 
defendant-public officials’ conduct.   
Part I recounted how the historical origin of the Section 1983 claim is 
inextricably linked to racial conflict and the deprivation of civil rights.  In the 
modern era, scholars have demonstrated that government surveillance, most 
 
 131. 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967). 
 132. See supra Section I.B. 
 133. See supra Section I.B.i.  
 134. See supra Section I.B.ii. 
 135. See supra Section I.B.ii.b.  
 136. See supra Section I.B.iii.  
 137. See supra Section I.B.iii.  
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notably made physically manifest through “Broken Windows” policing,138 
disparately impacts impoverished communities, as well as brown and Black 
individuals.139  However, the eye of the state, as well as its modes of 
oppression, does not stop at overly invasive, physical methods of policing.  
Scholars such as Michelle Alexander have famously demonstrated how 
increased surveillance of minority groups has led to a new legal caste system 
in the United States through the mass incarceration of Black men.140  
In some ways, this analysis builds on the fundamental premises of this 
scholarship.  However, I am interested in addressing how the state’s 
oppression of low-income individuals and communities of color lurks even 
in the legal claim that supposedly creates a cause of action for the vindication 
of rights against law enforcement officers.  I seek to demonstrate that even 
when the “bad behavior” of a law enforcement officer is supposedly on trial, 
the court’s eyes instead fall heavily on, and even punish, the conduct of the 
(often) Black and brown claimants.  
Section II.A draws the contours of this theoretical framework, first by 
defining government surveillance and explaining how government 
surveillance plays a role in policing and punishment in the United States.  
Section II.B outlines how the framing of government surveillance illuminates 
specific issues courts confront in applying the qualified immunity analysis in 
excessive force cases, mainly through factual reconstruction that hyper-
focuses on the plaintiffs’ conduct and obfuscates the behavior of defendants.  
Section II.B also draws on case studies of recent Supreme Court and federal 
appellate court decisions to demonstrate the theoretical framework.  Finally, 
Section II.C draws on observations from these case studies to create 
suggestions for various institutional actors, including courts seeking to apply 
the qualified immunity analysis in a way that regains analytical balance, as 
well as legislators hoping to reform the doctrine, and the public.141 
 
 138. Broken Windows policing is the name commonly given to proactive policing policies 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s in major cities across the United States, inspired by Kelling 
and Wilson’s famous article on order maintenance of the same name.  See George L. Kelling & 
James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/. 
 139. See infra Section II.A.ii.  
 140. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).  
 141. Obviously, many interests seek the total abolishment of qualified immunity as a legal 
defense.  However, this Comment will consider how state legislators could potentially reform 
qualified immunity if the alternative of reform is chosen.  For a discussion on the benefits of 
reforming, rather than abolishing, the doctrine of qualified immunity, see generally John C. Jeffries, 
Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207 (2013).  
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A. Government Surveillance, Race, and the Legal System 
i. Defining Surveillance 
The concept of surveillance has long been linked to the government’s 
assessment and control of criminality.142  Quite literally, surveillance is “the 
careful watching of a person or place, especially . . . because of a crime that 
has happened or is expected.”143  In his seminal work, Discipline and Punish: 
The Birth of the Prison, Michel Foucault argues that from the eighteenth to 
the twentieth century, the state’s primary means of punishment changed from 
public spectacle to surveillance.144  According to Foucault, through 
omnipresent, constant surveillance, the state maintains control by quickly 
perceiving and correcting the actions of “delinquent” citizens.145  As an 
example, Foucault drew on the model of the “Panopticon” prison created by 
eighteenth century philosopher Jeremy Bentham.146  In the Panopticon, an 
all-seeing prison guard sat at the center of a large, spherical prison structure 
in which he could peer into every prisoner’s room.147  The state, by analogy, 
constantly watches its citizens and exercises control through piercing, 
oppressive, and omnipresent scrutiny.148   
Modern commenters on surveillance often focus on the legal 
ramifications of new surveillance technologies, such as drones, and their 
intersection with the right to privacy,149 as well as the First Amendment right 
to free speech150 and the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable 
searches and seizures.151  However, it is worth noting that the implications of 
surveillance go well beyond an examination of the latest surveillance 
technologies, which often dominates the discussion.  The focus on advancing 
 
 142. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977). 
 143. Surveillance, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/ 
dictionary/english/surveillance (Nov. 28, 2020). 
 144. FOUCALT, supra note 142, at 195–208. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Michel Foucalt, “Panopticism” from Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison., 2 
RACE/ETHNICITY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOB. CONTEXTS 1, 5 (2008). 
 147. Id.   
 148. Id.  
 149. See W. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 
(1890) (arguing for the existence of a Constitutional “right to privacy.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 129 (1972) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972)) (arguing that a Constitutional right to “personal . . . privacy” emanates from 
the “penumbras” of rights guaranteed through the Bill of Rights).  In this context, the “right to 
privacy” has typically been construed as a right to decisional or bodily autonomy.  
 150. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”).  
 151. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).  
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technologies often obfuscates means of surveillance that are less flashy or 
more structurally embedded in everyday society, emerging “through 
legislation, codification, or cultural habit . . . developed or calcified into 
systems that fit neatly within our accepted societal institutions . . . virtually 
indistinguishable from the backgrounds of our everyday lives.”152  Shifting 
the conversation away from surveillance as it relates to informational 
privacy, this Comment builds upon a body of scholarship that has instead 
analyzed how Black and brown communities are disproportionately, and very 
physically, subject to the oppressive gaze of the state through policing and 
the legal system, and the implications raised therein under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
ii. Government Surveillance Through Policing and the Legal System   
In the United States, race, criminalization, and surveillance have been 
connected since the time of slavery.  Some scholars have argued that modern 
policing in the United States owes its origins, at least in part, to the regulation 
of the slave economy.153  Southern society used methods of control to extend 
the arm and eye of the state over enslaved persons and plantation space, such 
as slave patrols, which inspected the countryside for signs of escapees, slave 
passes, which served as the precursors to modern photo identification, and 
fugitive slave posters and laws.154  These methods created a system in which 
the overseeing class could “exercise surveillance” over the plantation at all 
times.155  
The state continues to exercise surveillance over minority bodies 
through modern methods of policing, specifically through broken windows 
policing156 and intelligence-led policing.  In the 1980s, law enforcement in 
large cities across the United States began to implement policing tactics that 
explicitly focused on aggressive enforcement of minor nuisance crimes, also 
called “quality of life” crimes.157  Influenced in part by Kelling and Wilson’s 
famous article, Broken Windows, police employed methods such as stop and 
 
 152. Jeffrey L. Vagle, The History, Means, and Effects of Structural Surveillance 10 (U. Penn. 
L. Sch., Pub. L. Rsch. Paper No. 16-3, 2016) (defining this kind of surveillance by the helpful term, 
“structural surveillance”).  
 153. See generally, e.g., CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 
FROM SLAVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); SALLY HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS (2003).  
 154. See HADDEN, supra note 153, at 41–71. 
 155. See PARENTI, supra note 153, at 13–33.  
 156. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  
 157. Id.   
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frisk,158 or “Terry stops,”159 and concentrated misdemeanor arrests as a way 
to deter crime through order maintenance.160  
Broken windows policing necessitates increased scrutiny by law 
enforcement officials of individuals in “poorly maintained” locations.  The 
state, surveilling the neighborhood, notes unkempt lawns or littered 
sidewalks and catalogues these signs of “disorder” as license to swarm the 
community with increased police presence.  However, the implementation of 
broken windows policing is inequitable, resulting in disproportionate police 
presence in places with elevated rates of poverty, as well as minority 
neighborhoods.161  The resulting highly concentrated police presence in many 
communities creates a state of near-constant police surveillance.  
This state of surveillance is not theoretical but rather all too tangible for 
those subjected to practices such as stop-and-frisk.162  For example, in New 
York City, citizens subjected to stop and frisk experienced bruising, torn 
clothing, and even unwanted sexual touching after being searched by 
police.163  Living under a state of constant surveillance can be palpably felt.  
To lower their chances of being stopped by police, some citizens in overly 
policed urban neighborhoods changed their hairstyles and clothing, as well 
as their route to work, and adopted the practice of carrying their drivers’ 
licenses at all times, even when out walking their dogs.164  Another reported 
feeling “nervous . . . paranoid, ‘cause you never know what’s going to 
 
 158. By stop and frisk, I refer to the policing practice of temporarily detaining people on the 
street, questioning them, and also physically searching or “frisking” them through a compulsory, 
hands-on search.  For example, from 2004 to 2012, the New York Police Department stopped and 
frisked more than four million New Yorkers.  See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND 
FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT 3 (2012) https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-
human-impact-report.pdf (defining stop and frisk).  
 159. “Terry stops” refer to the police practice of stopping citizens based on the standard of 
reasonable suspicion, rather than the higher standard of probable cause, approved by the Supreme 
Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  I refer to stop and frisk and Terry stops separately 
because of the distinct legal ramifications of many urban law enforcement stop and frisk policies, 
as opposed to “Terry stops” generally.  
 160. Jeffrey Fagan, Anthony A. Braga, Rod K. Brunson & April Pattavina, Stops and Stares: 
Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race in the New Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 539, 542 (2016).  
 161. See id. at 544; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: 
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 463–64 (2000) (“We find 
little evidence to support claims that policing targeted places and signs of physical disorder, and 
show instead that stops of citizens were more often concentrated in minority neighborhoods 
characterized by poverty and social disadvantage.”).  
 162. In Terry, the Court acknowledged that a frisk is “a severe . . . intrusion upon cherished 
personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
experience.” 392 U.S. at 24–25.  
 163. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 158, at 5.  
 164. Id. at 7.  
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happen.”165  Still another captured the unique humiliation of being subject to 
suspicious public gaze: “When they stop you in the street, and then 
everybody’s looking . . . it does degrade you.”166 
Though courts have struck down some explicitly race-based stop and 
frisk policies,167 these decisions do not encompass many similar or identical 
policing methods that do not explicitly rely on racial “discriminatory intent,” 
yet are still implemented in a racially disproportionate manner based on 
police discretion.168 
In some cities, police have expanded the Terry regime by explicitly 
adopting passive or surveillance-based policing models, which “more closely 
approximat[e] a panopticonistic vision of policing.”169  For example, the 
Boston Police Department mandates that officers must conduct non-contact 
surveillances of “known criminal offenders” as well as “known crime 
locations” during regular field observation.170  The result is that police log, in 
detail, the regular, everyday activities of citizens in the same informational 
database that houses information gathered from investigative stops.171  These 
“passive surveillance” activities have traditionally been used to track the 
activities of high-level criminal suspects denoted as national security 
concerns.172  Buoyed by digital-age developments, law enforcement officers 
increasingly rely on this kind of information-led, data-management driven 
policing.173  The result is a regime that vocally embraces government 
surveillance as a way to predict and control the behavior of its citizens, 
especially in communities of color.174   
 
 165. Id. at 6. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding 
New York City liable for stops and frisks which violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
because the stops were not based on “reasonable suspicion.”).  
 168. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–240 (1976) (stating that for an equal protection 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must show a facially neutral law with 
disproportionate racial impacts was conceived with discriminatory intent).  In Floyd, the Court 
concluded that racially disproportionate impact of wide-spread, official policy may be a permittable 
“starting point” to determine discriminatory intent.  959 F. Supp. 2d at 571.  
 169. Fagan et. al, supra note 160, at 551.  
 170. Id. at 547.  
 171. Id. at 547–551. 
 172. Id. at 551. 
 173. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the 
Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 112–13 (2008) 
(tracing developments in globalization and the surveillance state).   
 174. Fagan, et. al, supra note 160, at 550–51; see also BARTON GELLMAN & SAM ADLER-BELL, 
CENTURY FOUND., THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF SURVEILLANCE (2017), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/disparate-impact-surveillance/?session=1&session=1 (tracing the 
disparate impacts of surveillance through policing and the welfare system on communities of color 
in the United States). 
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State policies that disproportionately surveil communities of color 
extend beyond the streets and into courtrooms and prisons.  Scholars such as 
Michelle Alexander have shown how our very laws and institutions create a 
“racialized system of social control” through the mass incarceration of black 
bodies.175  For example, laws and policies passed in service of the “War on 
Drugs” in the last decades of the twentieth century created disparate levels of 
criminal classifications and mandatory sentence lengths176 for drugs more 
widely available and used in Black communities, as opposed to drugs used 
more often in white communities.177  As a result, Black men178 are often 
convicted at higher rates, for more serious crimes such as felonies, and 
remain incarcerated for far longer.179 
One can draw a line from the “racialized system of control” created by 
the intersection of law and policing in the United States to Foucault’s vision 
of the Panopticon, a method of punishment where the state exerts control over 
its “delinquent” subjects through total surveillance.180  Just as the guard in 
Foucault’s vision sits at the center of the prison, able to turn at any time to 
peer into the cell of any prisoner, here the state sits in the streets, the 
courtroom, and the jail cell, always able to surveil and scrutinize the behavior 
of black and brown communities, with drastic, and demonstrably inequitable, 
consequences.   
iii. Judicial Discretion and Section 1983 Claims  
Courts play a central role in enforcing a racialized system of control, 
especially in the criminal sphere, through their role in sentencing.  However, 
less attention has been paid to the ways that courts use their discretion to 
function as mechanisms of racial and social control beyond the obvious 
 
 175. ALEXANDER, supra note 140, at 178. 
 176. Id. 
 177. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES 
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS 
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 113–133 (Nov. 2004).  See also DEBORAH J. 
VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM, TWENTY 
YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW i–3 (2006) (explaining the racial and 
sentencing disparities between crack versus powder cocaine; “For example, distribution of just 5 
grams of crack [cocaine] carries a minimum 5-year federal prison sentence, while for powder 
cocaine, distribution of 500 grams – 100 times the amount of crack cocaine – carries the same 
sentence.”).  
 178. Though Alexander’s work focused mostly on the experiences of Black men, other scholars 
have shown similar disparate treatment and impacts for women of color.  See generally Stephanie 
Hong, Say Her Name: The Black Woman and Incarceration, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 619 (2018). 
 179. ALEXANDER, supra note 140, at 141–47 (explaining that, at the time, the average federal 
drug sentence for African Americans was forty-nine percent longer than the average federal drug 
sentence for Caucasians).  
 180. FOUCALT, supra note 142, at 195–208. 
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contexts.  By obvious contexts, I mean areas of law that obviously implicate 
race, such as criminal law, or constitutional claims brought to challenge a 
government program that relies on race, pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.181  However, constitutional tort 
claims182 against state officials, brought under Section 1983,183 are also 
connected with race in powerful and nuanced ways.  As recounted in Part I, 
legislators passed Section 1983 originally as a means of redress for former 
enslaved persons and people of color whose constitutional rights were 
violated in southern states following the abolition of slavery.184  Currently, 
though no widespread study has been conducted analyzing the demographics 
of those who bring claims against law enforcement officers for excessive 
force under Section 1983,185 it is reasonable to posit that a greater percentage 
of plaintiffs represent racial minorities.  This is mostly a statistical proffer.  
On the whole, people of color simply are more likely to have more frequent 
contacts with the police.186  Given that minority individuals are more likely 
to be on the receiving end of police misconduct, the importance of Section 
1983 actions for individuals of color should not be understated.  
In constitutional tort claims, judges hold the “keys to the kingdom” for 
plaintiffs through wide judicial discretion.  This judicial latitude is partly to 
be expected because of the very nature of constitutional tort law.  Awarding 
damages to redress constitutional violations is a relatively new practice, 
originating with the development of Section 1983.  Constitutional tort claims 
are therefore considered a kind of quasi-constitutional law, or “sub-
constitutional law.”187  The novel nature of weighing damages claims for 
constitutional violations therefore “requir[es] . . . judicial 
creativity. . . reflecting, implicitly or explicitly, the weighing of costs and 
benefits.”188  
Thus, it is worth noting that the kind of judicial discretion enjoyed by 
judges in constitutional tort claims may be wider than areas of law 
traditionally linked with race, such as criminal law.  For example, even 
 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”).  
 182. By constitutional tort, I mean an action by which individuals can directly bring claims 
against government officials for government-inflicted injury when their constitutional rights are 
violated.  Constitutional tort claims are generally brought against state officials under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and may be made against federal officials pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).   
 183. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 184. See supra Section I.A.  
 185. This is true at least to the author’s knowledge at the time of writing. 
 186. See supra Section II.A.ii 
 187. Jeffries, supra note 141, at 243. 
 188. Id.  
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judges who would like to impose softer, creative, or alternative solutions to 
minor drug offenders may be constrained by mandatory sentencing laws.189  
On the other hand, in a Section 1983 claim, the court plays a large role in 
determining remedy.  For example, the factfinders in Section 1983 claims 
may award nominative damages or punitive damages, but as in traditional 
tort claims, the judge may overturn a jury verdict if the judge believes jury 
damages are excessive.190  In addition, a judge can grant measures beyond 
damages such as injunctive relief.191  
Judges enjoy the most powerful discretion in Section 1983 claims 
through a vice-like grip over procedure.  Critically, judges decide whether a 
claim should be decided summarily in favor of the defendant-government 
official, as is often the case, or proceed to trial.  By making this decision, 
judges close the door to plaintiffs or keep the door open for a potential 
remedy, and judges face heavy pressure from the Supreme Court to decide in 
favor of the defendant-government officials.192  Scholars have posited that by 
demanding the dismissal of “insubstantial suits” in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,193 
the Supreme Court attempted to create a procedural mandate for judges, 
couched with the language of substantive law.194  However, as explained in 
Part I, this “reasonableness” analysis is infamously open-ended, lacking a 
clear liability rule195 and subject to competing directives.  
Armed with a curious level of procedural control over the outcome of 
Section 1983 litigation, judges fill in the cryptic dead-ends of the qualified 
immunity analysis with their own judgement.  Scholars have therefore 
suggested that the availability of remedies in a Section 1983 claim is almost 
solely determined by how a judge interprets qualified immunity and the 
identity of the defendant on trial.196   
If qualified immunity is read broadly to protect a wide range of 
constitutional error . . . the gap [between the rights guaranteed by the 
 
 189. See Tracie A. Todd. Mass Incarceration: The Obstruction of Judges. 82 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 191, 199–201 (2019) (reflecting that mandatory sentencing laws leave very little room for 
judicial discretion).  
 190. Sheldon Nahmod, Damages and Injunctive Relief Under Section 1983, 16 URB. LAWYER 
201, 203 (1984).  
 191. See generally United States v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1996) (standing for 
the proposition that judges have wide discretion to impose remedies in constitutional tort cases).  
 192. See supra Section I.B.   
 193. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 194. Jeffries, supra note 141, at 251 (“As thus interpreted, Harlow announced a change in 
substantive law, but it aimed at a change in procedure.  It sought to accelerate the dismissal of 
insubstantial suits and thus to protect government officers not only from liability but also from the 
burdens of discovery and trial.”).  
 195. Id. at 208–09. 
 196. Id. at 246. 
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Constitution and the availability of a remedy to enforce them] is large.  If 
qualified immunity were construed more narrowly . . . the gap would be 
reduced.197 
The conclusion that the outcome of Section 1983 litigation in excessive 
force claims is heavily influenced by judicial discretion is clear through the 
divergent results in federal courts nominally applying the same analysis.  As 
noted in Section I, the geographic disparities between the results of Section 
1983 cases are glaring.  In a recent study analyzing 435 federal district court 
rulings in excessive force cases in California and Texas over the span of 
almost five years, Texas federal district courts granted immunity to police in 
59% of cases as compared to 34% of California cases.198  Courts in Texas, 
nominally applying the same analysis as federal district courts in California, 
were almost twice as likely to grant officers qualified immunity.  At the 
appellate level—in a review of 529 cases since 2005—the same study found 
that the Fifth Circuit granted qualified immunity to officers in 64% of cases, 
in contrast with the Ninth Circuit, which granted qualified immunity in 42% 
of cases.199  
iv. Summary 
So far, Section II.A has defined government surveillance and traced its 
connection with state control and punishment generally, as well as its 
relationship with race in the United States.  In the United States, a system of 
social control exists in which low-income and Black and brown bodies are 
almost constantly subject to the oppressive gaze of the state through policing 
and the law.  Courts play a role in perpetuating this system of control—for 
example, through sentencing determinations in criminal law.  However, the 
Section 1983 cause of action provides an arena in which courts have broad 
power to provide or deprive low-income persons and racial minorities of 
remedies for the deprivation of constitutional rights.  Critically, based on the 
nature of constitutional tort law, courts enjoy wide discretion in Section 1983 
claims and in how the court chooses to interpret the defense of qualified 
immunity, leading to vastly divergent outcomes in different federal appellate 
circuits.  
 
 197. Id.  
 198. Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Jackie Botts, Andrew Januta & Guillermo Gomez, For 
Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/.  
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B. Unpacking the Ramifications of Qualified Immunity as a Mode of 
Government Surveillance  
This Section applies the framing of government surveillance to analyze 
how courts use their analytical discretion to conduct the qualified immunity 
analysis.  I suggest that one of the reasons that the current state of the law 
heavily favors defendants200 is because the mode of analysis courts employ 
in excessive force cases brought under Section 1983 hyper-scrutinizes the 
actions of plaintiffs.  Bringing the argument full circle, just as Foucault 
argued that the state exercises control through piercing, oppressive, and 
omnipresent scrutiny, a court may further this state control in excessive force 
cases by subjecting the plaintiffs to increased scrutiny.  In contrast, courts 
may functionally “overlook” the conduct of defendants, saving government 
officials from an objective gaze.  In this way, courts (unwittingly) further the 
oppression which Black and brown individuals, as well as low-income 
individuals, are subject to in other spheres through over-surveillance.   
This conclusion is unintuitive for several reasons.  Most obviously, the 
purpose of Section 1983 is to partially waive the government’s immunity 
from suit.  In Section 1983 claims, the conduct of the government is on trial 
through the actions of state officials.  One would intuit that in a cause of 
action which empowers citizens against the state, the state official’s actions 
should be closely scrutinized.  However, the opposite is true.  The qualified 
immunity analysis serves as a way for the courts to invert who and what is 
scrutinized in an excessive force claim brought under Section 1983.  Section 
II.B.i explains how the analysis of excessive force through Graham v. 
Connor inverts the court’s gaze to hyper-focus on plaintiffs by reconstructing 
facts through the eyes of defendant law enforcement officers.  Section II.B.ii 
explains how simultaneously, the qualified immunity analysis obfuscates any 
meaningful close scrutiny of defendants in four key ways.  
i. The Interaction of the Graham Analysis and the Qualified Immunity 
Analysis Inverts the Court’s Gaze to Hyper-focus on Plaintiffs 
and Overlook the Conduct of Defendants.  
First, courts hyper-scrutinize plaintiffs in a Section 1983 excessive force 
claim when the court analyzes whether the officer acted with excessive force 
under Graham v. Connor.201  The factors in Graham, which determine the 
reasonableness of an officer’s actions, explicitly focus on the plaintiff’s 
behavior, rather than the action of the defendant-public official.  By 
examining whether the plaintiff committed a crime, posed a threat to others, 
 
 200. See supra Section I.B; see also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 6. 
 201. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  
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or actively evaded arrest, courts scrutinize the plaintiff for signs that a 
defendant’s use of force was “justified.” 
Though courts nominally must consider the “totality of 
circumstances”202 and balance the interests of the government against 
individual rights,203 in excessive force cases courts are instructed to step into 
the shoes of the defendant in reconstructing the facts.  The Supreme Court 
has specified that the facts “must be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene,” instead of with the “20/20 vision of 
hindsight.”204  Even when courts attempt to scrutinize the amount of force a 
defendant uses, their scrutiny must be tempered by “allowance for the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”205  One could 
imagine an analysis that subjects the defendant-law-enforcement officer’s 
actions to real scrutiny, based on factors such as whether the defendant used 
the least amount of force available, or attempted de-escalation before 
engaging in force.  But under the current excessive force regime, courts are 
encouraged to focus the weight of their judgment on the plaintiff’s actions.206  
As a result, the seemingly objective excessive force standard is so focused on 
the defendant’s perspective that it becomes subjective, entirely focused on 
“the individual actor’s knowledge” of the plaintiff at the moment force was 
deployed.207 
Graham’s standard may be defended because officers almost always 
must act without perfect knowledge in high-stakes situations.208  Therefore, 
taking the perspective of the officer may be the only fair way to assess 
whether their use of force was reasonable.  And perhaps, if courts were not 
ordered to perform both the excessive force reasonableness analysis and the 
qualified immunity analysis, this would be a fair defense.  However, the 
“double layer of reasonableness”209 created by the interaction of the two 
analyses creates an almost impenetrable layer of subjectivity.  The current 
qualified immunity analysis ratchets up the level of subjectivity in excessive 
force cases further by obfuscating the real motives and behavior of 
defendants.  
 
 202. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985).  
 203. Id. at 8. 
 204. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 205. Kisela v Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam).  
 206. See Jeffries, supra note 51, at 861.  
 207. See id. (“Indeed, the Supreme Court’s definition of ‘objective unreasonableness’ might 
plausibly be called ‘subjective unreasonableness,’ as it turns so heavily on the individual actor’s 
knowledge and situation.”). 
 208. 490 U.S. at 397.   
 209. See supra Section I.B.iii.  
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The following cases demonstrate how courts hyper-scrutinize plaintiffs, 
yet simultaneously shield defendants from scrutiny through the qualified 
immunity analysis.  
a. Mullenix v. Luna: Whose Behavior is Closely Scrutinized?   
A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in a recent 
Supreme Court case, Mullenix v. Luna,210 illustrates how courts hyper-focus 
on the plaintiffs’ conduct in excessive force claims.  In Mullenix, the Court 
hyper-focused on the plaintiff’s, rather than the defendant’s, conduct in order 
to find that a police officer did not violate clearly established law when 
shooting at and killing a suspect engaged in a car chase, granting the officer 
qualified immunity.211  In its analysis, the Court overwhelmingly focused on 
the conduct and characteristics of the decedent, characterizing him as “a 
reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed 
vehicular flight, who twice during his flight had threatened to shoot police 
officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer at 
Cemetery Road.”212 
On the other hand, Justice Sotomayor ultimately reached her dissenting 
conclusion that Mullenix had violated clearly established law by closely 
scrutinizing the defendant Mullenix’s actions.  Justice Sotomayor began her 
dissenting opinion with the weight of the analytical lens focused fully on the 
defendant, Mullenix: “[Defendant] fired six rounds in the dark at a car 
traveling 85 miles per hour . . . without any training . . . against the . . . order 
of his superior officer . . . .”213  She noted that regardless of the danger the 
plaintiff posed, Mullenix still chose to deploy a potentially lethal tactic,214 
ignored the orders of superior officers to “stand by,”215 and “spent minutes in 
shooting position discussing his next step with a fellow officer” before 
making the decision to shoot the decedent.216  Justice Sotomayor even pointed 
to a statement made by Mullenix after the shooting, potentially suggesting he 
acted with bad faith.217  Perhaps most relevant to this analysis, Justice 
Sotomayor explicitly accused the majority of “recharacteriz[ing]” the facts to 
 
 210. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam).  
 211. Id. at 308. 
 212. Id. at 309. 
 213. Id. at 313 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 214. Id. at 314–15.  
 215. Id. at 314, 316. 
 216. Id. at 316.  
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paint the defendant making a “split-second, heat-of-the-moment choice” as 
opposed to a calculated decision to shoot.218 
In Mullenix, the majority reached its conclusion granting qualified 
immunity to the defendant-officer by focusing its critical lens squarely on an 
analysis of the decedent’s behavior.  The Court painted Mullenix as an officer 
acting in the heat of the moment to take down a grave threat to public safety.  
In contrast, by focusing on the defendant’s actions, Justice Sotomayor 
painted a starkly different picture of a shooter who had ample time to take an 
alternate course of action, but still chose to act with lethal force.  Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent in Mullenix illustrates how the court’s hyper-focus on 
the plaintiff obscured facts about the defendant relevant to the qualified 
immunity analysis.  
b. Nelson v. City of Battle Creek and Estate of Jones v. City of 
Martinsburg: Zooming In or Out? 
A comparison of two recent federal appellate court cases from the Sixth 
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit also demonstrate how the excessive force 
analysis and the qualified immunity analysis interact to hyper-surveil the 
behavior of plaintiffs and obfuscate the behavior of defendants.  In Nelson v. 
City of Battle Creek,219 the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision 
to deny qualified immunity to an officer who shot and injured a teenage boy 
(“N.K.”) playing with a B.B. gun.220  The key factual dispute in Nelson was 
whether the officer decided to shoot N.K. before or after N.K. attempted to 
toss the B.B. gun to the ground in compliance with the officer’s orders.221  
Notably, the district court rejected granting summary judgment to the officer 
because the legal question of qualified immunity “turn[ed] on disputed facts 
and depend[ed] on which view of the facts the jury might accept.”222  
However, denying that this dispute warranted deferring to a factfinder’s 
judgment, the Sixth Circuit granted qualified immunity to the officer.  
The Sixth Circuit’s view of the facts isolated the defendant from 
scrutiny.  In reconstructing the critical moment when the gun was fired, the 
court posited there was no real dispute because the testimonies “do not create 
a dispute of fact as to when [the officer] decided to shoot,” when “[the officer] 
saw N.K. grab and raise the gun.”223  Critically, the court noted that the 
plaintiff “fail[ed] to dispute this fact because N.K. and other witnesses cannot 
 
 218. Id.  
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speak to [the officer’s] decision-making or his perception of harm in the two-
second span the events unfolded.”224  Instead of focusing on when the gun 
was actually fired, which could be objectively determined from the video 
footage of the incident, the court held that the critical moment was when the 
officer decided to shoot, a subjective decision entirely internal to the 
officer.225  Obviously, the exact moment an officer decided to shoot cannot 
be gleaned by any amount of objective evidence.  Here, by shifting the critical 
factual inquiry from a moment objectively ascertainable through video 
footage or witness accounts, to a moment which objective evidence cannot 
address, the court insulated the officer from scrutiny.226   
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Estate of Jones v. City of 
Martinsburg227 proves a telling counter-example to Nelson.  In Jones, the 
court reversed summary judgment awarded by the district court to the 
defendants to hold that five law enforcement officers who shot a homeless 
man twenty-two times to death after he was stopped for jaywalking did not 
merit qualified immunity.228  Though noteworthy for the court’s dicta, which, 
in its concluding remarks about the case, explicitly referenced George Floyd 
and stated that to award qualified immunity in this case “would signal 
absolute immunity for fear-based use of deadly force, which we cannot 
accept,”229 Jones is also notable for the path the court took to arrive at its 
conclusion.  
At first glance, the Fourth Circuit’s reversal of qualified immunity 
seems surprising based on facts unfavorable to the decedent, Jones.  At the 
time of the encounter with law enforcement, Jones was armed with a small 
knife, which he later used to stab an officer.230  Further, Jones resisted verbal 
commands to drop the knife.231  Based on these facts, the lower court 
concluded that Jones presented an “ongoing threat” to the officers, justifying 
their use of force, because he possessed a weapon at the time of his death.232  
Yet, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Jones 
 
 224. Id. (emphasis added). 
 225. Id.   
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was “secured” and “incapacitated” in the moments before his death,233 and 
therefore the officers’ use of force was unreasonable.234  
In arriving at its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit went to great lengths to 
distinguish the possession of a weapon from Jones’s ability to use or wield 
the weapon.  In the court’s eyes, Jones was “secured” because, after being 
“tased four times, hit in the brachial plexus, kicked, and placed in a choke 
hold,”235 Jones fell to the ground, his left arm falling “limply to his body,” so 
that he would have been physically unable to wield the knife.236  Beyond 
Jones’s physical incapacitation, the Court noted the position of his body on 
the ground, the number of officers surrounding Jones, and the 
“inaccessible”237 location of the knife” as further support for the fact that 
Jones was secured.  
Thus, instead of focusing on a simple list of potentially damning facts, 
all centered on the decedent’s conduct (i.e., Jones had a knife, Jones fled from 
an officer, Jones resisted arrest, and Jones stabbed an officer), the Court 
fleshed out a moving picture of the encounter, attempting to contextualize the 
facts within the dynamics between Jones and the officers.  Towards the end 
of the analysis, the court “zoomed out” even more broadly to capture the 
overarching context of Jones’s encounter with police:  
Having zoomed in on the precise moments before Jones’s death, 
we pull back for context.  The defendants portray Jones as a 
fleeing, armed suspect, who was not cooperating with law 
enforcement and had even reportedly “hit” an officer, displacing 
that officer’s hat . . . Jones was not an armed felon on the run, nor 
a fleeing suspect luring officers into a high-speed car chase.  Jones 
was walking in the road next to the sidewalk . . . . He was without 
housing and had a knife on his person . . . . What we see is a scared 
man who is confused about what he did wrong, and an officer that 
does nothing to alleviate that man’s fears.  That is the broader 
context in which five officers took Jones’s life.238  
In Jones, the court understood that “zoom[ing] in” on the precise 
moments of the encounter actually crippled its analysis by forcing the court 
to focus on minutiae: Did Jones’s arm fall to the ground before or after the 
first shot was fired?  Was his body fully on top of his other arm, making the 
knife inaccessible?  At what angle was Jones’s holding the knife?  By 
focusing on the span of several seconds, the lower court’s analysis was 
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infected with a kind of myopia.  Instead, the Fourth Circuit chose to claw its 
way out of an analytical hole and “zoom out” to claim the power of context.  
Context revealed the more important facts.  Jones was simply jaywalking on 
the street.  He was schizophrenic and did not understand what he was being 
asked.  He was experiencing homelessness.  For this, he was shot twenty-two 
times by five police officers.  
“Zooming out” also allowed the court to subtly scrutinize the 
defendant’s behavior.  By making observations like “[Officer Lehman] 
quickly escalated the encounter,” and pointing out that the “officer [did] 
nothing to alleviate [the] man’s fears,”239 the court emphasized facts that 
highlighted the officers’ role in the encounter.  
Although the Sixth Circuit in Nelson “zoomed in” on the plaintiff’s 
behavior, interpreting the clearly established right at stake at a “microscopic” 
level, the Fourth Circuit in Jones zoomed out, pulling back for context in 
order to reclaim an objective lens. 
c. Jones v. Treubig and Franklin v. Franklin City: At What Level 
Should the Defendant’s Conduct Be Scrutinized?  
Finally, a comparison of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Jones 
v. Treubig240 (“Treubig”) and the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Franklin 
v. Franklin County241 perhaps most starkly illustrates how the qualified 
immunity analysis insulates defendants from judicial scrutiny.   
In Franklin, after a man died in police custody following a confrontation 
with officers, the Eighth Circuit reversed a denial of summary judgment to 
two of the officers involved in the encounter.242  Police arrested Franklin for 
“walking along a road” and “swinging a stick like a sword.”243  At 
containment, officers attempted to move Franklin to an isolation cell for 
arguing with other prisoners.244  During a violent encounter, the officers 
kicked Franklin, pinned him to the ground under the weight of several 
officers, tased him at least two times, and put him in handcuffs.245  Upon 
arriving in the cell, the officers attempted to remove the handcuffs, but 
because Franklin was still “resisting,” the officers kept him pinned to the 
ground, applying their bodyweight, and tased him up to five more times.246  
 
 239. Id. at 671. 
 240. 963 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2020).  
 241. 956 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2020).  
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 243. Id. at 1061.  
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Franklin died as a result of “methamphetamine intoxication, exertion, 
struggle, restraint, and multiple electro muscular disruption device 
applications.”247 
In Franklin, the court hyper-focused on the decedent’s conduct to 
conclude that he was acting “violently” and therefore the officers’ use of 
force was constitutional.248  The majority characterized Franklin as violent 
during the encounter, even though the officers tased Franklin up to eight 
times when he was already handcuffed and on the ground, because “the threat 
of Franklin’s violent aggression did not subside until after the final shot of 
the taser,” and “Franklin acted violently and uncooperatively immediately 
before each shock of the taser.”249  By breaking down the encounter to a series 
of truncated events, the court decided Franklin was “violent” because he 
showed minimal signs of resistance in the mere seconds between each taser 
deployment.  The court hyper-focused not only Franklin’s conduct, but the 
hypothetical threat someone in Franklin’s position would pose.  Instead of 
inquiring whether Franklin actually posed a threat to officers while pinned to 
the ground in handcuffs, warranting the use of a taser eight times, the court 
merely concluded, “[a] person in handcuffs can still present a danger to 
officers.”250  
At the same time, the court shifted any critical gaze away from the 
officers, minimizing the officers’ decision to use force by suggesting taser 
deployment on drive-stun mode “only causes discomfort and does not 
incapacitate the subject.”251  The court avoided scrutinizing the defendant 
officers’ choice to continue to use force simply by citing to the Supreme 
Court’s dicta in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 252 where the Court concluded that when 
officers are justified in firing at a suspect “to end a severe threat to public 
safety” the officers do not need to stop until the “threat has ended.”253  Yet, 
the proposition that Franklin, a man handcuffed in an isolation cell, presented 
“a severe threat to public safety” at an analogous level to a man involved in 
a high-speed car chase is questionable at best.  The court employed a dubious 
analogy to avoid scrutinizing whether the officers were reasonable in 
continuing to use force by deploying a taser eight times.   
In contrast—in an analysis that contradicts Franklin at almost every 
turn—the Second Circuit held that an officer was not entitled to qualified 
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immunity for multiple deployments of a taser in Jones v. Treubig,254 because 
the court closely scrutinized the defendant’s conduct in-between taser 
deployments.255  The plaintiff, Jones, who was attempting to return his 
uncle’s prescription medication, was stopped by police and resisted arrest.256  
The defendant-officer tased Jones—while Jones was laying, pinned, on the 
ground—two times. 
In Treubig, the court scrutinized the officer’s decision to deploy the 
taser a second time separately from the first taser deployment.  Instead of 
simply accepting that Jones’s original resistance meant continual resistance, 
the court analyzed whether, based on jury interrogatories at the district court, 
evidence supported that Jones was resisting arrest at the time of the second 
tasing.257  The court emphasized that Jones did not concede that he could 
physically move after the first tasing, leading to a genuine dispute of material 
fact.258  The court then closely scrutinized the officer’s behavior, emphasizing 
the critical fact that after deploying the first taser, the officer had time to 
reassess the situation before deploying a second time, in order to refute that 
the officer could not adequately assess whether Jones was still resisting in a 
rapidly evolving situation.259  Thus, by turning the critical lens sharply on the 
defendant’s knowledge immediately before the second tasing, the Second 
Circuit reached the result that a second use of force could be unreasonable 
under the totality of the circumstances.   
d. Summary 
In summary, these cases demonstrate how the Graham excessive force 
analysis encourages courts to hyper-focus on the plaintiffs, leading to factual 
reconstruction which “zooms in” on plaintiffs’ behavior, focusing on 
minutiae and losing the power of context and objectivity.  Simultaneously, 
the current qualified immunity analysis ratchets up the level of subjectivity 
in excessive force cases by obfuscating the behavior of defendants.  
ii. The Qualified Immunity Analysis Further Obfuscates the 
Defendant Officer from Scrutiny in Excessive Force Cases in 
Four Key Ways.  
The qualified immunity analysis further obfuscates the behavior of 
defendants in excessive force cases in four key ways.  First, the clearly 
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established law standard prevents courts from scrutinizing a defendant’s 
actual knowledge of their actions’ constitutionality.  Second, the 
abandonment of the subjective prong of the analysis casts a veil over a 
defendant’s state of mind.  Third, courts are primed to overlook the behavior 
of defendants through the stated purposes of the qualified immunity analysis 
to decide fewer cases on the merits.  Fourth, the current state of qualified 
immunity law encourages courts to minimize the role of an objective 
factfinder.  
a. The Clearly Established Law Standard Prevents the Court 
from Scrutinizing an Officer’s Actual Knowledge  
First, in the “clearly established law” analysis, courts use past legal 
decisions about use of force as a proxy for whether the officer had notice of 
whether a certain use of force would be constitutional.260  However, as others 
have noted, whether case law actually supplies government officials notice 
of the law is in itself a questionable proposition; it has even been called a 
“legal fiction.”261  When previous legal decisions are rigidly accepted as the 
sole indicator of constitutional notice, an officer’s actual knowledge of 
whether their use of force was reasonable or constitutional becomes obsolete.  
In other words, it is possible that an officer may possess actual knowledge or 
suspicion that a certain use of force is probably unconstitutional, but if the 
accepted legal proxy does not exist, what the officer did or did not know does 
not matter.  The court is disallowed from scrutinizing or probing the officer’s 
actual knowledge.  
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court’s lack of clear direction on 
acceptable sources of clearly established law exacerbates the problem.  
Sources of persuasive authority may allow plaintiffs to show that even if a 
prior legal decision is not “on point,” police officers had constructive notice 
that their acts may be unconstitutional through accepted and widely followed 
department rules or official manuals of conduct.  However, only a few 
circuits allow an analysis of persuasive authority to establish notice of 
unconstitutionality.262  It is also true that the police department may strictly 
prohibit a certain use or method of force, but this prohibition would still not 
serve as adequate evidence that the officer should have been on notice about 
their conduct.  In summary, the more rigidly the clearly established law 
analysis is applied, the more the defendant-public official is insulated from 
 
 260. See supra Section I.B.ii.  
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real scrutiny.  The defendant-law-enforcement officer’s actual knowledge of 
potential unconstitutionality is essentially off-limits for courts to scrutinize.   
b. The Abandonment of the Subjective Prong of the Analysis 
Casts a Veil Over the Officer’s State of Mind. 
Similarly, the current law prohibits any real scrutiny of defendant-law 
enforcement officers through the abandonment of the subjective prong of the 
qualified immunity analysis.  Before Harlow v. Fitzgerald,263 courts could 
scrutinize whether a defendant-executive official acted with “malicious 
intention” to deprive an individual of a Constitutional right.264  The showing 
of malicious intent sufficed to prove the officer was not entitled to qualified 
immunity.  By forbidding courts to inquire whether an officer actually 
intended to act unconstitutionally, the Court shielded the officer from 
scrutiny.  Now, a police officer may actually intend to act unconstitutionally, 
but their conduct will be excused so long as no prior case provided “notice” 
that the behavior was definitively unconstitutional.  In so doing, the Court 
further shields the defendant from real scrutiny.  
For example, in Estate of Jones,265 the Fourth Circuit introduced facts 
gathered through video recording, which subtly impugned the officers’ state 
of mind at the time of the encounter.  The Court specified that, “[o]ne officer 
can be heard loudly calling Jones a ‘mother***ker.’ . . . At least one officer 
can be seen kicking Jones violently as he lay on the ground,”266 and later, that 
after killing Jones, the officers concluded they had “to gather some f**king 
story.”267  These details could feasibly provide evidence that the officers 
knew their conduct was unconstitutional.  Similarly, in Mullenix,268 Justice 
Sotomayor pointed to a statement made by the officer after he shot and killed 
the decedent suggesting he had acted in bad faith.269  Yet, under the current 
regime, these facts are analytically useless.  Courts are disallowed from 
probing the officers’ state of mind.  The defendants’ real motives and 
intentions are hidden behind an analytical veil. 
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c. Courts are Primed to Overlook an Officer’s Behavior Through 
the Instruction to Decide Fewer Cases on the Merits.   
Further, at a meta-level, the purpose of the qualified immunity analysis 
gives courts incentive to overlook the behavior of defendants in their 
analyses.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the purpose of 
qualified immunity is to reduce the number of cases that proceed to trial 
against the government.270  Thus, the Court’s “goal in formulating qualified 
immunity is chiefly to affect the administration of summary judgment in 
constitutional tort actions.”271  As a result, courts approach the qualified 
immunity analysis in excessive force cases with a predisposition towards 
awarding summary judgment to defendant-officers. 
Notably, the stated goal of qualified immunity creates a procedural 
paradox for courts analyzing the facts of a case.  Appellate courts may review 
summary judgment awarded to police officers on issues of excessive force 
when a matter of law is at stake, subject to de novo review.  Based on the 
relevant standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts must 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to 
determine whether summary judgment was warranted when there is a 
genuine dispute of material fact.272  But the Supreme Court’s essentially 
procedural mandate, clothed with the veil of substance, affects how lower 
courts must view disputed facts.  Directed by the overarching goal of saving 
the government from the burdens of a real trial, judges are already primed to 
view the facts in favor of defendants.   
The Court’s mandate to decide fewer cases on the merits is critically 
important to the framing of government surveillance.  A court’s standard of 
review can be understood as the color applied to the courts’ critical lens.  
When the standard of review is favorable to the non-moving party, the court 
will view the facts “colored” by that party’s perspective. 
On the Court, dissenters such as Justice Sotomayor have critiqued the 
Court for failing apply the correct critical lens in excessive force cases.273  
For example, in her Mullenix274 dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted that her 
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denial of qualified immunity followed directly from the correct application 
of the relevant standard of review.275 
Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s factual reconstruction even 
more pointedly in a similar dissent in Kisela v. Hughes,276 where the Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity to a police officer 
who shot a woman behaving erratically with lethal force.277  The Court 
arrived at its conclusion by focusing on the plaintiff’s behavior through the 
eyes of the defendant officer: “He was confronted with a woman who had 
just been seen hacking a tree with a large kitchen knife and whose behavior 
was erratic enough to cause a concerned bystander to call 911 . . . .”278  
However, Justice Sotomayor chastised the majority for failing to construe the 
facts in the light most favorable to the decedent:  
This case arrives at our doorstep on summary judgment, so we 
must “view the evidence . . . in the light most favorable to” 
Hughes, the nonmovant, “with respect to the central facts of this 
case.”  The majority purports to honor this well-settled principle, 
but its efforts fall short.  Although the majority sets forth most of 
the relevant events that transpired, it conspicuously omits several 
critical facts and draws premature inferences that bear on the 
qualified-immunity inquiry.  Those errors are fatal to its analysis, 
because properly construing all of the facts in the light most 
favorable to Hughes, and drawing all inferences in her favor, a jury 
could find that the following events occurred on the day of Hughes’ 
encounter with the Tucson police.279  
Here, Justice Sotomayor essentially accused her fellow Justices of 
failing to view the facts of the case objectively.  By hyper-focusing on the 
behavior of the plaintiff and failing to apply a standard of review that 
construed facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Justices overlooked “critical 
facts” that bore on the clearly established law analysis.  For example, “the 
police officers themselves never witnessed any erratic conduct,”280 “the other 
two officers on the scene declined to fire at Hughes,”281 suggesting that lesser 
means of force were necessary, and “the officers did not observe any illegal 
activity while at the scene.”282  
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d. The Current State of Qualified Immunity Law Encourages 
Courts to Minimize the Role of an Objective Factfinder Such 
as the Jury.  
Finally, the current qualified immunity analysis encourages courts to 
minimize the role of an objective factfinder.  Because courts are instructed to 
reduce the number of cases decided on the merits, courts are more likely to 
minimize factual disputes that could conceivably go before a jury.  For 
example, in Nelson, 283 the Sixth Circuit denied that any factual dispute 
existed as to whether the plaintiff had already thrown down his weapon when 
the officer fired by re-characterizing the critical inquiry as the moment when 
the officer decided to shoot.284  The court then substituted its own judgment 
for that of a potential jury’s to conclude that the moment that the officer 
decided to shoot was before the plaintiff had dropped his weapon.285  
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Estate of Jones286 emphasized and 
elevated the role of the reasonable factfinder.287  In fact, the emphasis on the 
reasonable factfinder was key to the court’s clearly established law analysis 
in Estate of Jones.  The court framed the constitutional question at stake in 
the case as whether at the time of the shooting “it was clearly established that 
officers may not shoot a secured or incapacitated person.”288  However, given 
that Jones was armed with a knife and had attempted to stab an officer, this 
framing was not necessarily intuitive.  The court arrived at its framing by 
drawing on the perspective of a phantom jury in reconstructing facts.  The 
court concluded that Jones was “secured” before he was shot because a 
reasonable jury could find that he could not move when pinned to the ground 
by five officers, and “incapacitated” because “a jury could reasonably infer 
that Jones was struggling to breathe.”289  
Throughout its analysis, the court continually presented two potential 
versions of events and demurred that a reasonable fact-finder would be able 
to find either for the Estate or for the defendants, justifying the case 
proceeding to trial.290  For example, in addressing the “problematic” fact that 
Jones possessed a weapon, the court concluded that that “these admitted facts 
do not preclude a jury from finding that [Jones] was secured.”291  Similarly, 
 
 283. Nelson v. City of Battle Creek, 802 F. App’x 983 (6th Cir. 2020).  
 284. See supra notes 223–226 and accompanying text.  
 285. Nelson, 802 F. App’x at 988. 
 286. Estate of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2020).  
 287. See supra notes 233–238 and accompanying text.  
 288. Estate of Jones, 961 F.3d at 668.  
 289. Id. at 668–69.  
 290. See supra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. 
 291. Estate of Jones, 961 F.3d at 669. 
  
870 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:830 
 
the court admitted that “to be sure, the incident moved quickly,” but still, “[a] 
jury could reasonably find that Jones was secured before the officers backed 
away, and that [they] could have disarmed Jones and handcuffed him . . . .”292  
The court’s focus on the reasonable factfinder in in Estate of Jones was 
critical.  Instead of solely reconstructing the facts through the perspective of 
a reasonable officer on the scene, the court introduced the perspective of a 
phantom third-party.  Through this phantom party’s eyes, a quickly moving 
encounter between a citizen and an officer became subject to alternative 
explanations, highlighting the real factual disputes that should proceed to 
trial, instead of emphasizing what the officer thought, felt, and believed about 
the situation.  The Fourth Circuit did not discount the officer’s perspective, 
but rather presented the officer’s perspective as one of two competing 
explanations of the encounter.  The court then considered whether both 
explanations were sufficiently viable to proceed to trial.  In this way, the court 
staunchly pushed against the inertia of subjectivity in the clearly established 
law analysis.  
Similarly, in Treubig,293 the Second Circuit focused on the perspective 
of the reasonable factfinder.294  At trial, after the jury awarded Jones nominal 
and punitive damages against Treubig, the district court granted judgment as 
a matter of law to the defendant.295  On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded 
that the court had incorrectly taken a question of fact from the jury:   
Not only was there evidence in the record to support that Jones was 
no longer resisting arrest at the time of second tasing, but the jury 
made that specific factual finding in a special interrogatory.  
Because that jury finding was rationally supported by the above-
referenced evidence in the record (if credited), it must be accepted 
for purposes of the qualified immunity analysis utilizing, to the 
extent any other factual issues remain, the underlying evidence in 
the light most favorable to Jones. . . . And, importantly, disputed 
material issues regarding the reasonableness of an officer’s 
perception of the facts (whether mistaken or not) is the province of 
the jury, while the reasonableness of an officer’s view of the law is 
decided by the district court.”296  
Thus, the court defended the jury’s role as the ultimate arbiter of facts, 
even disputed facts pertaining to an officer’s perception of the encounter.  
This emphasis is critical to the framing of surveillance because the Second 
Circuit resisted insulating the officer’s view of the facts from scrutiny.  
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Instead of allowing the state official’s view of the threat determine the 
outcome of the case, the Second Circuit instead insisted that even his 
perception should be subject to scrutiny by a reasonable fact-finder.  
e. Summary 
In excessive force cases, the qualified immunity analysis leads courts to 
closely inspect the behavior of plaintiffs while veiling the defendants from 
scrutiny.  The Graham excessive force analysis leads to factual 
reconstruction that “zooms in” on plaintiffs’ behavior, focusing on minutiae 
and losing the power of context and objectivity.  Simultaneously, the 
qualified immunity analysis ratchets up the level of subjectivity in excessive 
force cases by obfuscating the behavior of defendants.  The qualified 
immunity analysis obfuscates defendants from scrutiny in four ways.  First, 
the clearly established law standard prevents courts from scrutinizing a 
defendant’s actual knowledge of his actions’ constitutionality.  Second, the 
abandonment of the subjective prong of the analysis casts a veil over a 
defendant’s state of mind.  Third, courts are primed to overlook the behavior 
of defendants through the stated purpose of the qualified immunity analysis 
to decide fewer cases on the merits.  Fourth, the current state of qualified 
immunity law encourages courts to minimize the role of an objective 
factfinder.  As a result of the interplay between the qualified immunity and 
excessive force analyses, cases which would typically proceed to trial based 
on a dispute about the existence of material fact are decided summarily based 
on the reconstruction of the factual record.  
C. Reclaiming Objectivity Under the Qualified Immunity Analysis in 
Excessive Force Claims 
This Section inquires as to how the connection between government 
surveillance and qualified immunity may elucidate practical solutions for 
lower federal courts and state courts in excessive force claims brought under 
Section 1983 or state analogues, informed by the case studies in Section II.B.  
The framing of government surveillance illuminates a severe lack of 
objectivity as the fatal flaw in the current state of the law.  Thus, this Section 
suggests ways that federal and state courts may regain analytical balance by 
reclaiming objectivity within the framework accepted by the Supreme Court.  
This Section also includes suggestions for other institutional actors, such as 
legislators and the general public.  Seven brief observations emerge.  
First, courts should emphasize and elevate the role of the jury.  Second, 
courts should hesitate to interpret the Supreme Court’s substantive changes 
to qualified immunity doctrine as procedural mandates.  Third, courts can 
leverage judicial discretion to scrutinize the conduct of defendants in 
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reconstructing facts.  Fourth, members of the public should continue to record 
police-citizen encounters.  Fifth, legislative reformers should consider 
restoring the subjective prong of the qualified immunity analysis.  Sixth, 
courts should use persuasive authority in defining clearly established law.  
And finally, courts should consider their unique institutional competencies 
and power over individuals deprived of constitutional rights when shaping 
qualified immunity doctrine. 
i. Courts Should Emphasize and Elevate the Role of the Jury.  
Courts applying the qualified immunity analysis may reach vastly 
different results when the perspective of a reasonable factfinder is introduced, 
emphasized, and elevated in excessive force cases.  As explained in Section 
II.B, the “double layer of reasonableness” created by the qualified immunity 
analysis pushes courts to careen into subjectivity when reconstructing facts 
in excessive force cases.  One way to reclaim objectivity, as Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent in Kisela297 and cases such as Estate of Jones298 and 
Treubig299 suggest, is to incorporate the perspective of a phantom, objective 
third-party.  In these cases, the construct of the reasonable factfinder 
functions to highlight the existence of genuine factual disputes.  
Similarly, the reasonable factfinder construct creates a way that courts 
can scrutinize a defendant’s perception of the facts.  Importantly, this 
suggestion does not impugn the directives of the Supreme Court.  As the 
Second Circuit in Treubig emphasized, an officer’s perception of the law is 
for courts to decide, yet the officer’s perception of facts is not beyond the 
scrutiny of the jury.  Courts may obey the directive to analyze the excessive 
force claim from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, while 
simultaneously allowing that perspective to be scrutinized by a reasonable, 
objective factfinder.  
ii. Courts Should Hesitate to Interpret the Court’s Stated Goals in 
the Qualified Immunity Analysis as Justifying a Procedural 
Change to Standards of Review.  
The Supreme Court has, time and again, emphasized that the goal of 
qualified immunity is to insulate the government from the burdens of 
discovery and litigation by deciding fewer cases on the merits.300  Yet, the 
Court cannot change the standard of review applicable in a case without 
formally revising the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  As Justice 
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Sotomayor pointed out in Kisela, when cases arrive on appeal from summary 
judgment, as they often do in qualified immunity cases, courts still must view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.301  Thus, when 
the defendant appeals a denial of qualified immunity, the suggestion that 
courts should be predisposed to settle cases through summary judgment 
seems to be in direct tension with the rule that the court must view all 
evidence in favor of (in this case) the plaintiff.   
But when these two directives conflict, a court should resist the impetus 
to allow the Supreme Court’s motivations for the qualified immunity analysis 
to change the way it applies the relevant standard of review.  As Section II.B 
demonstrates, the standard of review has the potential to powerfully impact 
the outcome of the case on appeal by framing the way that the court 
reconstructs fact.  For example, in Treubig, the district court belatedly 
granted judgment as a matter of law on the issue of qualified immunity to the 
defendant after a jury had awarded damages to the plaintiff.302  Arguably, the 
standard of review the Second Circuit applied on appeal, that the court must 
“consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
the motion was made,”303 and “give that party the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence,”304 
changed the outcome in favor of the plaintiffs.  The Second Circuit applied a 
critical lens favorable to the plaintiff in order to scrutinize the actions of the 
defendant before the deployment of a second taser strike.  
This analysis has demonstrated that the court’s method of factual 
reconstruction—namely, who and what the court chooses to scrutinize—
matters.  Thus, courts should hesitate to construe the Supreme Court’s 
predisposition towards summary judgment as license to change the standard 
of review, which influences who the court chooses to scrutinize. 
iii. Courts Can Leverage Judicial Discretion to Scrutinize the 
Conduct of Defendants in Reconstructing Facts.  
In some ways, the qualified immunity analysis is interpretively 
restrictive (in other words, appellate courts risk reversal by the Supreme 
Court if the analysis is applied incorrectly).305 Yet, this Comment has 
demonstrated that courts also enjoy wide discretion in applying the qualified 
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immunity analysis.  Courts reach vastly disparate outcomes applying the 
same law to similar facts.  In the Second Circuit, a court may choose to 
scrutinize a second taser deployment as analytically separate from the first 
deployment and conclude that a reasonable jury may find the second 
deployment unreasonable.306  In the Sixth Circuit, a court may decline to 
scrutinize seven subsequent taser deployments, concluding that 
reasonableness is solely determined by the hypothetical existence of an 
ongoing threat.307  
Whether such wide judicial discretion is analytically desirable is 
debatable.  The Section 1983 action theoretically provides a cause of recourse 
for individuals whose rights have been violated by government actors.  The 
fact that an individual may not have a remedy for this violation, solely as an 
accident of geography, seems to be an aberration of this principle.  In 
addition, as discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court has issued seemingly 
competing and conflicting directives in this area of law.  Yet, scholars have 
suggested that wide judicial discretion may simply be par for the course with 
constitutional tort law.308  In other words, even if the Supreme Court spoke 
more directly on conflicting issues, Section 1983 actions would still require 
judges to use creativity and ingenuity in balancing the interests of the 
government versus the interest of individuals.309 
Notably, courts enjoy the most latitude in reconstructing facts.  The 
Supreme Court cannot simply overturn a case because it disagrees with a 
court’s finding of facts but must also take issue with the court’s legal 
application of the qualified immunity doctrine.  Thus, the Supreme Court has 
often seemed to apply summary reversals to the most egregious aberrations 
from their desired application of qualified immunity based on the clearly 
established law standard.  For example, in reversing the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in City of Escondido v. Emmons,310 the Supreme Court chastised the 
Ninth Circuit for not even attempting to define the constitutional right with a 
level of specificity, instead concluding that “the ‘right to be free of excessive 
force’ was clearly established” by the Fourth Amendment.311  
Cases such as Estate of Jones v. Martinsburg312 demonstrate how a court 
can make a good-faith attempt to define the constitutional violation at a high 
level of specificity, while taking advantage of its wide discretion in 
 
 306. See supra notes 257–258 and accompanying text.  
 307. See supra notes 248–252 and accompanying text.   
 308. See Jeffries, supra note 141, at 243. 
 309. Id.  
 310. 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019).   
 311. Id. at 503 (quoting Emmons v. City of Escondido, 716 Fed. App’x 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2018)).  
 312. 961 F.3d 661 (4th Cir. 2020).  
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reconstructing facts.  In Estate of Jones, by applying the correct standard of 
review, the Fourth Circuit engaged in a thorough analysis of the facts to frame 
a specific constitutional violation.313  Critically, instead of hinging its 
conclusion on a list of facts solely damning to the plaintiff, the court 
contextualized unfavorable facts in the wider encounter between police and 
the decedent.  Estate of Jones demonstrates that courts do not have to hyper-
focus on the conduct of plaintiffs while obfuscating the conduct of defendants 
in the qualified immunity analysis.  By acknowledging facts unfavorable to 
the decedent, yet simultaneously applying a critical lens to the defendants’ 
conduct, the court used its discretion to conduct an analysis which meets 
Section 1983’s foundational command to balance government interests and 
individual rights. 
iv. Members of the Public Should Continue to Record Encounters 
Between Citizens and Law Enforcement Officers as an Aid to 
Courts in Reconstructing Facts Objectively. 
One tool courts can employ in reconstructing facts objectively is the use 
of recording technologies.  Nominally worn as a safeguard against police 
abuse of power, ongoing debate remains about the efficacy of police-worn 
body cameras.314  In addition, the fact that cameras are outward-facing raises 
its own issues within the framing of government surveillance.  One could 
argue that in a police-citizen encounter, the fact that the citizen’s behavior is 
the main subject of recording, not the officer’s, only adds fuel to the fire of 
subjectivity.  If introduced as evidence, the court sees the encounter from the 
law enforcement officer’s view, conceivably duplicating Graham v. 
Connor’s315 command to view the facts through the eyes of the reasonable 
officer at the scene. 
Yet, recording technologies can still play a role in reclaiming 
objectivity.  For example, in Estate of Jones,316 the Fourth Circuit frequently 
drew on video recordings of the police-citizen encounter to intersperse its 
analysis with details that painted a more complete picture of the 
circumstances surrounding the decedent’s death.  The court used recordings 
to conclude that the decedent was incapacitated at the time of his death based 
 
 313. Id. at 669.  (Specifically, whether police could use deadly force against a man who was 
secured and incapacitated). 
 314. Candice Norwood, Body Cameras Are Seen as Key to Police Reform. But Do They Increase 
Accountability?, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 25, 2020, 4:41 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/body-cameras-are-seen-as-key-to-police-reform-but-do-
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 315. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 316. 961 F.3d 661.  
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on the sounds of gurgling and choking caught on tape.317  In addition, the 
Estate of Jones court scrutinized the behavior of the defendant-police officers 
by pointing out that one officer could be seen kicking the decedent after he 
was already restrained.318  The court also chose to include details gleaned 
from the recording technology that impugned the officers’ state of mind.319  
In Estate of Jones, the court used technology to subtly turn the weight of the 
analytical lens back to the defendants, regaining balance in an analysis which 
typically hyper-focuses on plaintiffs’ conduct.  
Of course, the use of recording technologies will be most beneficial, and 
most powerful, when third-party witnesses and bystanders capture 
encounters between citizens and law enforcement officers objectively, and in 
full.  Through the framing of government surveillance, nothing could more 
powerfully challenge the state’s critical focus on its citizens.  Simply consider 
the power and impact that one such recording has had on the public 
conscience and imagination—a witness’ recording of the murder of George 
Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officers.320  Courts have wide 
latitude to reconstruct facts, but what if the court is forced to watch both sides 
of the facts play out before its eyes?  How can the court, faced with an 
objective recording of the encounter, faithfully apply the lens of the 
defendant-police officer in reconstructing facts—especially if the 
defendant’s behavior is egregious and gruesome to watch?  Arguably, these 
kinds of recordings have the potential to seriously challenge the current state 
of qualified immunity law by providing an undeniably objective version of 
events.   
v. Legislative Reformers Should Consider Restoring the Subjective 
Prong of the Qualified Immunity Analysis.  
The discussion of recording technologies exposes a related solution to 
the issues posed by the qualified immunity analysis.  As the law currently 
stands, even if a recording technology captured clear evidence of malice, it 
would not matter.  In Estate of Jones,321 as well as Justice Sotomayor’s 
 
 317. Id. at 669 (“Jones had been tased four times, hit in the brachial plexus, kicked, and placed 
in a choke hold, at which point gurgling can be heard in the video.”); id. at 665 (“A loud choking 
or gurgling sound, which seems to be coming from Jones, is audible on Staub’s audio recorder at 
this time.”). 
 318. Id. at 665. 
 319. Id. at 666 (noting that after fatally shooting Jones, one officer exclaimed, we “have to gather 
some f**king story”).  
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dissenting opinion in Mullenix,322 the judges identified facts about the 
defendants’ conduct which feasibly impugned their state of mind at the time 
the officials used force.323  Yet, based on Harlow, the malicious intent to 
deprive an individual of a constitutional right is irrelevant to the qualified 
immunity analysis.324  Many others have pointed out that restoring the 
subjective prong of the qualified immunity analysis would create more 
equitable results.325  This analysis has demonstrated that the rejection of 
subjective intent is especially egregious because it further casts a veil over 
defendant law enforcement officers, obfuscating state officials from real 
scrutiny.  
Thus, if legislators seek to reform, rather than abolish, the doctrine of 
qualified immunity, specifying that plaintiffs can introduce evidence relating 
to bad faith is a good place to start.  Practically, a state legislature could craft 
a claim which functions as a state analogue to Section 1983 and specify 
within the text: Qualified immunity will not be available as a defense to these 
claims if the public official can be shown to have been acting with malicious 
intent or otherwise in bad faith to deprive an individual of a constitutional 
right.   
vi. Courts Should Use Persuasive Authority to Define Clearly 
Established Law. 
Courts should use sources of persuasive, as well as mandatory, authority 
in the clearly established law analysis.  As discussed in Section II.B, legal 
decisions are probably not a realistic proxy for the defendant’s actual 
knowledge or notice of unconstitutional force.  However, within the law as it 
currently stands, courts should at least attempt to broaden the universe of 
potential case law available to plaintiffs in establishing constitutional notice.  
For example, in Treubig,326 the Second Circuit drew on the decisions of sister 
circuits to establish that an officer should be on notice that deploying a taser 
a second time may be unconstitutional when the force is no longer necessary 
due to the totality of the circumstances.327  Specifically, the court held that 
 
 322. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 313 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 323. Id. at 316 (observing that after killing the decedent, the defendant said to his commanding 
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 324. .See supra Section I.A. 
 325. .ee, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 8, at 73. (“Restoring the subjective prong to qualified 
immunity analysis could also mitigate at least one serious concern with the doctrine. . . . If the 
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the clearly established law was clear not only from the Second Circuit’s own 
decisions, but also “reinforced by a compelling consensus of cases in our 
sister circuits.”328  The court relied on cases from the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits in determining that the law was clearly established.329 
In Treubig, the Second Circuit correctly looked to these decisions to 
support its analysis.  By using persuasive sources of authority, the court 
painted a more realistic picture of the defendant official’s knowledge at the 
time of the encounter based on broadly accepted uses of force.  Courts should 
draw on persuasive authority especially when it takes the form of department 
manuals, codes or trainings.  These sources may provide direct evidence of 
an officer’s actual knowledge at the time of use of force, and should not 
escape close scrutiny.  
vii. Courts Should Consider Their Institutional Competencies, As 
Well As Their Power Over Individuals Deprived of 
Constitutional Rights, While Crafting Qualified Immunity 
Doctrine.  
Judicial actors at each level have unique institutional competencies 
which impact how courts approach excessive force claims and the doctrine 
of qualified immunity.  For example, most Section 1983 claims are heard by 
federal courts, giving federal district and appellate courts an outsized 
opportunity to shape the qualified immunity defense.330  Federal appellate 
courts, especially, are subject only to the limitation of reversal by the 
Supreme Court.  However, federal district courts should also consider the 
powerful role they play in qualified immunity analysis by creating and 
shaping the factual record.  This Comment has demonstrated how the 
outcome of excessive force cases often turns on one or two critical facts.  
Appellate courts are tasked with reviewing summary judgment granted based 
on qualified immunity de novo, which means that appellate courts do not 
have to take the district courts’ versions of events as a given.  However, 
district courts are still the first arena in which the factual record is created 
and shaped, and judges are the powerful overseers of this process.   
At the state level, state courts may enjoy the most judicial discretion and 
latitude in shaping qualified immunity doctrine.  Section 1983 claims can 
also be brought in state courts, and  state courts often hear these claims along 
with state common law claims such as battery or assault, and claims brought 
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under state constitutional analogues to Section 1983.  State courts have wide 
latitude to apply state common law and to interpret state constitutional law.  
Even though most states have some version of qualified immunity, critically, 
states do not have to apply the same mode of federal analysis to state qualified 
immunity doctrines.  Thus, state courts are in a unique position to create and 
craft remedies for individuals in Section 1983 claims by using their own 
discretion beyond the doctrinal limitations of qualified immunity’s federal 
counterpart.  
Finally, others have established the role of courts in perpetuating race-
based inequalities through over-policing and over-surveilling racial 
minorities.  Yet, this Comment has sought to demonstrate the unique role 
courts may play in denying remedies to these individuals.  In a common law 
system, change occurs through the multiplication or whittling away of 
precedent based on individual acts of judicial discretion.  When courts apply 
a qualified immunity analysis that fails to subject defendants to real scrutiny, 
future, individual plaintiffs are those who will pay.  These individuals are 
often members of racial minority groups.  Yet, precedents gather momentum 
over time to transcend the level of the individual and impact our public 
consciousness.  Courts must acknowledge how deliberately failing to 
scrutinize the conduct of law enforcement officers and “zooming in” on 
plaintiffs’ conduct may directly impact and inflame racial and class-based 
tensions.  The framing of government surveillance is ultimately useful for 
suggesting that the critical lens through which the court weighs the actions 
of individuals and state officials, and more specifically, who the court 
chooses to scrutinize, matters.  
III. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has introduced the concept of government surveillance 
to re-frame the discussion surrounding the defense of qualified immunity in 
cases brought under Section 1983 pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.  The 
qualified immunity analysis, based on its historical roots and present 
application, can be considered a mode of government surveillance.  
Specifically, as judges exercise their judicial discretion through doctrinal 
interpretation, the qualified immunity analysis simultaneously “zooms in” on 
plaintiffs’ behavior while obfuscating law enforcement officers’ conduct.  
Though Section 1983 theoretically provides an individual cause of action for 
the deprivation of constitutional liberties, the qualified immunity doctrine 
creates a near-impenetrable veil under which state action is not seriously 
scrutinized.  Thus, state oppression lurks even in the legal claim which 
supposedly creates a cause of action for the vindication of individual rights.  
This analysis directly supports and extends the theory that Black, brown, and 
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impoverished communities are overwhelmingly subject to government 
surveillance through policing and the legal system.  Even when the “bad 
behavior” of a law enforcement officer is supposedly on trial, the court hyper-
surveils and punishes the conduct of the citizen bringing the claim through 
the qualified immunity defense.   
Finally, the framing of government surveillance elucidates practical 
suggestions for various institutional actors including courts, legislators, and 
the general public.  Most importantly, courts must consider their institutional 
competencies and power in shaping qualified immunity doctrine.  Who and 
what is scrutinized through the act of judicial interpretation matters.  
